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On December 6, 2005, shortly before the World Trade Organization
("WTO") Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, WTO member states agreed
to accept a protocol of amendment' to the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs Agreement"). 2 This
amendment sought to provide a permanent solution to implement paragraph
6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health ("Doha
Declaration").3 If ratified, the new article 31bis of the TRIPs Agreement will
allow countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity to import
generic versions of on-patent pharmaceuticals.'
t Copyright © 2008 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law &
Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School; Wenlan Scholar
Chair Professor, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law; Visiting Professor of Law,
Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. Earlier versions of this Article were presented at the
"Tackling Global Health Issues Through Law and Policy" Symposium at Boston University
School of Law, the Second EDGE Network Annual Conference in Vancouver, Canada, and the
"Strategies to Implement a WIPO Development Agenda" Workshop at the University of Hong
Kong Faculty of Law. The Author would like to thank Kevin Outterson and Jeremy de Beer for
their kind invitations; Brook Baker, Shamnad Basheer, Robert Bird, Dan Cahoy, Colleen
Chien, Carolyn Deere, Peter Drahos, Richard Gold, Gerald Keusch, Jean-Frederic Morin,
Srividhya Ragavan, Xue Hong, and the participants of these events for their valuable
comments and suggestions, and Jonathan Soike for excellent research and editorial assistance.
I See General Council, Amendment of the TRIPSAgreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005),
available at www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/wt1641_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPs
Amendment].
2 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement], available at www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/27-trips.pdf.
3 See World Trade Organization [WTO], Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, WT/MIN(O1)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
4 Although the initial deadline for ratification was December 1, 2007, the deadline has
been recently extended for another two years. William New, TRIPS Council Extends Health
Amendment; Targets Poor Nations' Needs, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Oct. 23, 2007, www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=798. As of this writing, slightly over a quarter of the 151 WTO
member states, including the United States, India, Japan, China, and most recently members
of the European Communities, have ratified the proposed amendment. Press Release, WTO,
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To facilitate the supply of essential medicines to countries with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity, article 31bis(3) creates a special
arrangement not only for the affected countries, but also for those belonging
to a regional trade agreement.' Such an arrangement allows less developed
countries 6 to aggregate their markets to generate the purchasing power
needed to make the development of an indigenous pharmaceutical industry
attractive. 7 It also paves the way for the development of regional supply
centers,8 procurement systems, 9 and patent pools and institutions, while
facilitating technical cooperation within the region. 10
Unfortunately, because article 31bis specifically requires that least
developed countries make up at least half of the membership of any
beneficiary regional trade agreement, the provision would benefit only a
limited number of less developed countries, predominantly those in Africa."
Even worse, the interpretation of the provision remains contested within the
WTO. While the European Communities "insisted that the [provision]
should be limited to what is effectively sub-Saharan Africa," less developed
countries in Asia, the Caribbean, and South America embrace a much broader
interpretation of article 3Ibis(3)."2
In light of the limited benefits of the proposed amendment to the TRIPs
Agreement, this Article explores how greater collaboration among the BRICS
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and between these
countries and other less developed countries can promote access to essential
medicines in the less developed world. Part I introduces the five BRICS
countries by offering a brief discussion of each country in the area of
international intellectual property protection. This Part explains why South
Africa is included along with the four largest emerging economies.
Countries Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement (Aug. 2, 2007),
www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/amendmente.htm.
5 TRIPs Amendment, supra note 1, art. 31bis(3).
6 The TRIPs Agreement distinguishes between developing and least developed
countries. This Article uses "less developed countries" to denote both developing and least
developed countries. When referring to the TRIPs Agreement, however, this Article returns to
the terms "developing countries" and "least developed countries."
7 See Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 848
(2007).
8 See Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round's Public Health
Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended
TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 921, 973-77 (2007) (discussing the potential benefits of
pooled procurement strategies and the establishment of regional pharmaceutical supply
centers).
9 See SISULE F. MUSUNGU ET AL., UTILIZING TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC
HEALTH PROTECTION THROUGH SOUTH-SOUTH REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS, XV-XVi (2004),
www.southcentre.org/index2.php?option=com-docman&task=doc_view&gid=9&Itemid=68
(advocating the establishment of "regional procurement systems where they would jointly
conduct tendering through an entity acting on their behalf and a central purchasing agency
managing the purchases on behalf of all the member countries"); see also id. at 70-73
(discussing regional procurement systems).
10 See TRIPs Amendment, supra note 1, art. 31bis annex 5.
1 See id. art. 31bis(3) (requiring that "at least half of the current membership of [the
regional trade agreement] is made up of countries presently on the United Nations list of least
developed countries").
12 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 8, at 945.
BRICS ALLIANCES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
Part II then advances the hypothesis that, if the BRICS countries are
willing to join together to form a coalition, it is very likely that the resulting
coalition will precipitate a negotiation deadlock similar to the historic
stalemate between developed and less developed countries before the
adoption of the TRIPs Agreement. This Part explains why these five countries
collectively would possess such immense power to stop the push by the
European Communities and the United States to ratchet up global intellectual
property standards while threatening to grind the intellectual property
harmonization process to a halt.
Part III questions whether these five countries can build a sustained
coalition in light of their very different historical backgrounds; the divergent
levels of political, social, economic, and cultural developments; and the well-
documented historical failures for less developed countries to build or
maintain effective coalitions. Taking these challenges and potential hurdles
into account, this Part contends that it may be more realistic for less
developed countries to enter into alliances with one or more of the BRICS
countries. Although these partial alliances will not have the same bargaining
leverage as a complete BRICS coalition, this Part notes that the resulting
alliances will still be quite effective in advancing the interests of less
developed countries.
Part IV highlights the role that the BRICS coalition or partial BRICS
alliances can play in the international intellectual property regime. It
discusses four coordination strategies through which less developed countries
can strengthen their collective bargaining position, influence negotiation
outcomes, and promote effective and democratic decisionmaking in the
international intellectual property regime. This Part contends that less
developed countries, through collective action and better coordination, can
enhance access to essential medicines by establishing an effective negotiation
agenda, fostering more coherent positions among less developed countries,
and obtaining better bargaining results. Such collaboration will also help
develop a more powerful voice for the less developed world in the
international debates on public health, intellectual property, and international
trade.
Part V concludes with a discussion of the various challenges confronting
the creation and maintenance of partial BRICS alliances. Due to the extended
length of this article, this Part does not offer proposals to alleviate these
challenges. It nevertheless underscores the importance for both the BRICS
countries and other less developed countries to take advantage of the alliances
when the interests of both groups of countries are still close to each other.
The Article ends on an optimistic note-stating that, if less developed
countries can use collective action to their advantage, they may be able to not
only reduce the ongoing push by the European Communities and the United
States to ratchet up global intellectual property standards, but also will
enlarge the policy space that can be used to develop their intellectual property,
trade, and public health policies.
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I. MEET THE BRICS
In October 2003, two global economists from the investment bank
Goldman Sachs published a study entitled Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to
2050.13 Using a term coined in 2001 for a group of fast-growing developing
countries by the bank's chief global economist, Jim O'Neill,"4 the study found
that the economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China ("BRIC") are likely to
overtake those of many existing developed economies by 2050. As it declared:
In less than 40 years, the BRICs' economies together could be
larger than the G6 in US dollar terms. By 2025 they could
account for over half the size of the G6. Currently they are worth
less than 15% .... Of the current G6 (US, Japan, Germany,
France, Italy, UK) only the US and Japan may be among the six
largest economies in US dollar terms in 2050."
Because of its provocative finding, the study has attracted considerable
attention and debate. The study has also sparked further research by both
economists within the bank and elsewhere.16 In a follow-up study, the
Goldman Sachs team found that "[t]he BRICs' share of world growth could
rise from roughly 20% in 2003 to more than 40% in 2025."17 In a decade,
more than 800 million people across the BRIC economies will have an income
of over $3,000, "a number greater than the population of the US, Western
Europe and Japan combined.""
To help us better understand the importance of the BRICS countries, and
to lay the foundation for the discussion of the BRICS coalition and partial
BRICS alliances, this Part offers a brief discussion of each country in the area
of international intellectual property protection. It also explains why this
Article includes South Africa, even though the Goldman Sachs study omitted
the country on the basis of its "significantly smaller" projected economy 9 This
Part discusses the BRICS countries in the following order: Brazil, India,
China, Russia, and South Africa. Russia is discussed after the other BRIC
countries because it remains outside the WTO, and South Africa is added at
the end to create the BRICS acronym used throughout this Article. (If Russia
is excluded, due to its lack of WTO membership, the BICS acronym or the
"BICS Quad" can be used instead.)
13 Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050
(Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 99), www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/global-
growth/99-dreaming.pdf.
14 GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL ECONOMICS GROUP, BRICs AND BEYOND 5 (2007)
[hereinafter BRICs AND BEYOND].
15 Wilson & Purushothaman, supra note 13, at 4.
16 See, e.g., BUILDING A FUTURE WITH BRICs: THE NEXT DECADE FOR OFFSHORING 1, 3
(Mark Kobayashi-Hillary ed., 2008) [hereinafter BUILDING A FUTURE WITH BRICs];
EMERGING ECONOMIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: BRAZIL,
RUSSIA, INDIA AND CHINA (Subhash C. Jain ed., 2007) [hereinafter EMERGING ECONOMIES];
BRICs AND BEYOND, supra note 14; Dominic Wilson et al., The BRICs and Global Markets:
Crude, Cars and Capital (Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 118, 2004), available
at www.new-frontiers.org/classicdocs/thebricsreport.pdf.
17 Wilson et al., supra note 16, at 4.
is Id.
19 Id. at 11.
BRICS ALLIANCES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
A. BRAZIL
Brazil, which has the world's fifth largest population, is the poster child of
the use of-or, more precisely, the threat to use-compulsory licenses to
promote access to essential medicines. Although the country has repeatedly
obtained concessions from major pharmaceutical firms through these threats,
in April 2007 Brazil finally granted compulsory licenses for the non-
commercial public use of the patented AIDS drug efavirenz.2° It remains to be
seen how active Brazil will be in using compulsory licenses to promote public
health.
Over the years, Brazil has also developed a very successful program to
provide free, universal access to the treatment of HIV/AIDS. Its National
STD/AIDS Programme "has reduced AIDS-related mortality by more than 50
percent between 1996 and 1999. In two years, Brazil saved $472 million in
hospital costs and treatment costs for AIDS-related infections." 21 The
Programme has been widely recognized as a model for the less developed
world.
For decades, Brazil has been a leading voice for less developed countries.
During the TRIPs negotiations, it was one of the ten hardliner countries that
refused to expand the mandate of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") to cover substantive intellectual property issues. 23 During the
Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancfin ("Cancfin Ministerial") in 2003,
Brazil choreographed the G-20,24 whose demands and resistance led to the
20 See Press Release, Brazilian Ministry of Health, Brasil decreta licenciamento
compuls6rio do Efavirenz (May 5, 2007), available at
portal.saude.gov.br/portal/aplicacoes/noticias/noticias-detalhe.cfm?co-seq-noticia=29717.
As Robert Bird and Daniel Cahoy have noted, "[i]t is likely that the move was at least partially
sparked by the desire to obtain the same price Thailand secured following its successful
issuance of several compulsory licenses for AIDS and heart drugs." Robert C. Bird & Daniel R.
Cahoy, The Emerging BRIC Economies: Lessons from Intellectual Property Negotiation and
Enforcement, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 400, 421 (2007) [hereinafter Bird & Cahoy,
Emerging BRIC Economies].
21 Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A
Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 32 (2002).
22 See id. (noting that "[t]he Brazil AIDS program serves as a model for some
developing countries that are able to produce medicines locally"); COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL
PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY:
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 43 (2003) (noting that the
National STD/AIDS Programme in Brazil "has been widely acclaimed as a possible model for
other countries"); John S. Odell & Susan K. Sell, Refraining the Issue: The WTO Coalition on
Intellectual Property and Public Health, 2001, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA 85, 96 (John S. Odell ed., 2006) (observing that
"[d]eveloping countries looked to Brazil as a beacon of hope in strategies to combat the
HIV/AIDS crisis").
23 See JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 19 (2001). The other countries were Argentina, Cuba, Egypt, India,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia.
24 The current members of the G-20 are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba,
Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. The
website of the G-20 is available at www.g-20.mre.gov.br. Notably, the G-20 includes all
BRICS countries that are members of the WTO. G-20, G-20 Members, www.g-
20.mre.gov.br/members.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
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collapse of the ministerial conference." A year later, Brazil, together with
Argentina, introduced an important proposal to establish a development
agenda within the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO").26 The
proposal was adopted in October 2007, and the Development Agenda now
includes "a series of recommendations to enhance the development dimension
of the Organization's activities."2 7 Along with countries in South America and
Southeast Asia, Brazil has been very active in supporting the free and open
source software movement.28
As of this writing, Brazil remains the only less developed country that has
ever requested consultations pursuant to the WTO dispute settlement process
with any developed country concerning the noncompliance of intellectual
property laws with the TRIPs Agreement. 29 Because of Brazil's aggressive
public health positions and its leadership in the less developed world, the
United States Trade Representative includes the country annually in its
infamous Section 301 List among countries that pose major barriers to U.S.
intellectual property exports.
B. INDIA
India, the world's largest democracy and second most populous country, is
the other important voice for the less developed world. When Brazil
requested consultations with the United States through the WTO dispute
settlement process, India was the only other country that requested to join
those consultations. 2  Indeed, India's active lobbying on behalf of less
developed countries for lower intellectual property protection and special and
differential treatment dates back to reforms introduced in the country shortly
25 See Elizabeth Becker, Poorer Countries Pull Out of Talks Over World, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2003, at Al; Editorial, The Cancun Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at A24
[hereinafter The Cancun Failure].
26 See Press Release, World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Member States Agree to
Further Examine Proposal on Development (Oct. 4, 2004), available at
www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2004/wipo-pr_2004_396.html.
27 Press Release, WIPO, Member States Adopt a Development Agenda for WIPO (Oct.
1, 2007), available at www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2007/articleoOO71.html.
28 See Brian Fitzgerald & Nic Suzor, Legal Issues for the Use of Free and Open Source
Software in Government, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 412, 422 (2005) (including South Africa, Brazil,
Spain, Finland, and India among "examples of governments moving towards open source
solutions"); Daniel F. Olejko, Comment, Charming a Snake: Open Source Strategies for
Developing Countries Disillusioned with TRIPs, 25 PA. ST. INT'L L. REv. 855, 858 (2007)
(noting that "[t]he [open source] movement's strongest support and largest concentration of
countries lies in South America where Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela have
displayed wide acceptance of open source software in both government and industry").
29 See Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States-US Patents Code,
WT/DS224/1 (Feb. 7, 2001). It is important to note that the request was made in response to
the United States' challenge of Brazil's patent laws before the WTO. As Gregory Shaffer
lamented, "Brazil... never seriously pursued their claims to advance commercial interests, but
rather searched for bargaining chips for a potential settlement of the US and EC complaints."
Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates?
Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L.
459, 471 (2004) [hereinafter Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods].
30 See Request to Join Consultations by India, United States-US Patents Code,
WT/DS224/2 (Feb. 19, 2001).
BRICS ALLIANCES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
after its becoming an independent state." These reforms included differential
treatment for food, medicine, and chemical inventions; the prohibition of
patents in pharmaceutical products (as compared to processes used to
manufacture those products);32 and the provision of compulsory licensing to
encourage the local working of patents.3
During the 1967 Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, India and
other less developed countries demanded special concessions in the
international copyright system in light of their divergent economic, social,
cultural, and technological conditions. Although an insufficient number of
Berne Union members ratified the Stockholm Act, thus necessitating a
renegotiation of the revision text in Paris four years later, the Stockholm
Conference led to the creation of WIPO and the inclusion of the Protocol
Regarding Developing Countries in the Berne Convention. 5 Both WIPO and
the protocol remain vital parts of the current international copyright
arrangement.
Along with Brazil and other less developed countries, India also
demanded a revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property3 6 in an effort to lower the minimum standards of intellectual
property protection as applied to them.3 7 The revision process eventually
broke down during the 1981 diplomatic conference in Nairobi, following
demands by less developed countries for exclusive compulsory licensing of
patents and the United States' strong objection to those demands.3" That
stalemate ultimately led to the shift of multilateral negotiations from WIPO to
GATT/WTO, the establishment of the WTO and the TRIPs Agreement, and
the now-turbulent marriage of trade and intellectual property3 9
In the past few years India has been listed in the United States Trade
Representative's Section 301 Priority Watch List. 40  In 1997, the country
31 See Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Inequals of the Uruguay Round, 10 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 273, 278-89 (2006) (discussing the Ayyangar Committee Report and early
patent reforms in India).
32 See Peter Drahos, Securing the Future of Intellectual Property: Intellectual Property
Owners and Their Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 53,
76 (2004) (noting that "India's success in building a strong pharmaceutical industry was based
in large measure upon its recognition of patents for pharmaceutical processes, but not for
pharmaceutical products").
33 See id. at 289-92.
34 See Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright-
Past, Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1065 (1968). For a detailed discussion of the
origin and aftermath of the Stockholm Protocol, see SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND
BEYOND 879-963 (2d ed. 2005).
35 See Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual
Property Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 323, 328 (2004) [hereinafter Yu, Currents and
Crosscurrents].
36 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
37 Watal, supra note 23, at 16.
38 See id.
39 See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 35, at 357-66.
40 See IP Justice, United States Trade Representative (USTR) Section 301 Annual
Reports (2001-2007), ipjustice.org/USTR/Section 301_Table_2001-2007.htm (last visited
Jan. 26, 2008).
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became the respondent of the first intellectual property dispute in the WTO
process that resulted in the establishment of a dispute settlement panel. In
the parallel proceedings of India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, the United States and later the European
Communities successfully challenged the failure by Indian patent law to
establish a mailbox system as required under article 70(8) of the TRIPs
Agreement.4
Shortly before January 1, 2005, the deadline by which the TRIPs
Agreement requires all developing countries to introduce protection for both
pharmaceutical products and processes, India introduced a new patent law. 2
Although this new law is likely to have a major impact on the development
and availability of cheap, generic drugs and related ingredients, it does not
affect the production of drugs that have already been developed. The new law
also includes specific provisions to allow generic manufacturers to continue to
sell drugs that are already developed by paying reasonable royalties to patent
holders. " Notwithstanding these safeguards, commentators have been
particularly concerned about the impact of the new law on the global supply of
generic drugs, because India "makes more than a fifth of the world's generic
drugs.""
C. CHINA
China, the world's most populous country, is the "new kid on the block" in
the WTO. On December 11, 2001, the country formally became the 143rd
member of the international trading body.45 Notwithstanding its recent
membership, China's piracy and counterfeiting problems have been a major
issue affecting its bilateral trade with the United States since the mid-1980s.
4 6
As a result, the country catches the attention of the United States Trade
41 Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997); Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998). Article
70(8) of the TRIPs Agreement requires those member states that do not offer protection for
patents in pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products to introduce a mechanism to
adequately preserve the novelty and priority of applications for the affected patents. TRIPs
Agreement, supra note 2, art. 70(8). Article 70(9) further requires these member states to
establish a system for granting exclusive rights to market the affected products. Id. art. 70(9).
42 For a comprehensive discussion of the recent changes in Indian patent law, see
generally Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India's
Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491
(2007); Ragavan, supra note 31.
4 See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 7, at 863.
44 KAMAL NATH, INDIA'S CENTURY 110 (2008); see also Colleen Chien, HIV/AIDS Drugs
for Sub-Saharan Africa: How Do Brand and Generic Supply Compare?, 2 PLOS ONE e278
(2007) (reporting that India provided 85% of generic HIV/AIDS antiretrovirals in Sub-
Saharan Africa), available at ssrn.com/abstract=1009287.
45 Symposium, China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. AsIAN
L. 1, 2 (2003) [hereinafter Symposium, China and the WTO].
46 For discussions of piracy and counterfeiting problems in China in the 1980s and
1990s, see Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in
the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 131 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to
Partners 1]; Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: Using Shakespeare to
Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 1 (2001).
BRICS ALLIANCES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
Representative annually-under the Section 301 Watch List, the Priority
Watch List, or other special arrangements. Most recently, China became the
respondent of the first WTO dispute on intellectual property enforcement that
has resulted in the establishment of a dispute settlement panel.4 7 A number of
countries have since joined the dispute as third parties.4"
Notwithstanding the considerable piracy and counterfeiting problems in
China, there has been noticeable improvement of intellectual property
protection in the country's major cities and the coastal areas.4 9 There has also
been emerging industrial development in the areas of computer programs,
movies, semiconductors, and biotechnology. Such developments have led me
to suggest elsewhere that the many conflicts and competing interests within
China are likely to drive the country's leaders to develop a "schizophrenic"
nationwide intellectual property policy.5" While the country wants stronger
protection for its fast-growing industries, it prefers weaker protection in fields
related to pharmaceuticals, chemicals, fertilizers, seeds, and foodstuffs, due to
its huge population, continued economic dependence on agriculture, the
leaders' worries about public health issues, and their concerns about the
people's overall well-being.
Although China has hitherto maintained a relatively low profile in the
WTO,5' and serves mostly as a respondent in WTO complaints, that position
will change as the country develops greater WTO-related expertise and
becomes more adept in responding to internal problems caused by the WTO
accession. Indeed, despite being a new member, China already provided
major support to less developed countries during the Canciin Ministerial. As
Sungjoon Cho noted: "[T]he 'China factor' enabled the creation of the G-21
[or the G-20].... EWlith China in their ranks, the size and impact of this
coalition became unprecedented." 2 In the years to come, China is likely to
become a very important player in the WTO, even if it does not become as
vocal a leader as Brazil or India.
47 See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China-Measures
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/7 (Aug.
21, 2007).
48 Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the United States, China-
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
WT/DS362/8 (Dec. 13, 2007). Third parties involved in this dispute include Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Communities, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Chinese
Taipei, Thailand, and Turkey. Id. 5.
49 See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual
Property in Post-WTO China, 55 Am. U. L. REV. 901, 975-99 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From
Pirates to Partners I1] (examining the progress China has made in the intellectual property
arena).
50 See Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual
Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 25-26 [hereinafter Yu, International
Enclosure, the Regime Complex].
51 See Henry S. Gao, China's Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer's Perspective, 11 SING.
YB. INT'L L. 1, 29-30 (2007) (explaining why "China has consistently taken a low profile in all
WTO activities"); see also Yan Li, Faint Silhouette: Can China Be a WTO Leader?, WASH.
OBSERVER, Dec. 14, 2005, www.washingtonobserver.org/en/topic.cfm?topicid=29&charid= 3
(reporting an interview with the Author on China's potential leadership in the WTO).
52 Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference
in Canczin and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 235 (2004).
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D. RussIA
Russia, which has the world's ninth largest population and whose
economy is projected to be the smallest among the BRIC countries by 2050, is
the leftover Big Brother from the Cold War era. As a major military power
with nuclear capabilities, it has an enviable status in world politics and is of
great political importance to the European Communities and the United
States. 3 It also has very high research-and-development capabilities and a
considerable amount of technology-related human capital-two critical
elements for the successful development of indigenous intellectual property
industries.
As of this writing, Russia is still struggling in its negotiations to enter the
WTO-a daunting task that took China more than fifteen years.54 Although
Russia's piracy and counterfeiting problems are as serious as, if not more
than, those of China," the country's limited economic growth has made
Russia a less attractive market for Western businesses. While Russia is
occasionally criticized, such as in the case of the Russia-based downloading
website www.allofmp3.com, 56 the country's piracy and counterfeiting
problems have caught less media attention. When Russia finally enters the
WTO, it is likely to face similar transitional challenges that currently confront
China. In fact, the strong likelihood that Russia will be unable to comply
satisfactorily with all WTO standards shortly after its entry into the WTO has
made EC and U.S. policymakers very reluctant to allow Russia to join the
international trading body.
E. SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa is a strong economy that follows the BRIC countries in terms
of its economic growth, but from quite a distance. It also has a much smaller
population than each of the BRIC countries. As a result, South Africa was left
out of the Goldman Sachs study. Nevertheless, in the near future, the country
will remain quite powerful vis-A-vis other less developed countries, even
though its economy may not compare favorably to that of the BRIC
countries.
5 7
Having the largest economy in the African continent, the country will
have continuing influence over other countries within the continent, and
possibly even those in Asia, the Caribbean, and South America. In addition,
South Africa has been cited as an example of the wider socio-economic and
public health problems caused by high intellectual property standards
53 See Bird & Cahoy, The Emerging BRIC Economies, supra note 20, at 409 (noting that
"India lacks the economic power of China and the political importance of Russia in the eyes of
the United States").
54 Symposium, China and the WTO, supra note 45, at 2.
55 See INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 115 (2007)
(noting that "Russia's current copyright piracy problem remains one of the worst of any
country in the world").
56 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2007 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 498 (2007).
57 See Wilson & Purushothaman, supra note 13, at 11.
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required by the TRIPs Agreement.58 Along with Brazil and India, South
Africa was prominently involved in the negotiations 9 that led to the Decision
on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health."° It has also been instrumental in putting the
access-to-medicines issue on the human rights and public health agendas.6'
Today, South Africa remains very active in the access-to-medicines debate.
In retrospect, one could argue that the campaign on access to drugs, to
which South Africa made an important contribution, provides a major turning
point in the TRIPs debate.6 2 When South Africa enacted a law to allow for
compulsory licenses used in the manufacture of generic HIV/AIDS drugs in
December 1997, the South African Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
brought suit to challenge the law before the Pretoria High Court.63 The
United States government backed the industry by putting South Africa on the
Section 301 Watch List and announcing the suspension of its Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) benefits.6 ' Fortunately for South Africa and the
less developed world, the South African government received considerable
support from advocacy and minority groups and AIDS activists in the United
States. The issue became quickly tied up with American electoral politics and
has led to the erection of such politically-damaging banners as "Gore's Greed
Kills."65 The Clinton administration eventually backed away from its original
stance, even though it was heavily lobbied by the pharmaceutical industry.
Noticing the public outrage over the lawsuit and its weak legal position, the
South African Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association dropped the lawsuit
in April 2001.66
F. SUMMARY
In the future, each of the BRICS countries-Brazil, Russia, India, China,
or South Africa-is likely to play an important role in the development of the
international intellectual property regime. To be certain, all of these countries
still have many internal problems, such as limited judicial independence in
China, severe infrastructural problems in India, heavy debts in Brazil, and
58 See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 146-62 (2003); Debora Halbert, Moralized Discourses:
South Africa's Intellectual Property Fightfor Access to AIDS Drugs, 1 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 257
(2002); 't Hoen, supra note 22.
59 See Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal
Support, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 483, 496 (2007).
60 General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPSAgreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 1, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 509 (2004).
61 See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 7, at 865-66.
62 See SELL, supra note 58, at 181 (observing that "[t]he HIV/AIDS pandemic was a
contingency that sped up the revelation of the negative consequences of TRIPS"); Ruth Mayne,
The Global Campaign on Patents and Access to Medicines: An Oxfam Perspective, in GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 244, 249 (Peter
Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002) (noting that "[t]he South African government's decision to
fight the case was a critical factor in generating global media interest").
63 See SELL, supra note 58, at 151.
6 See id. at 152.
65 See id. at 152-53; see also Halbert, supra note 58, at 270.
66 See 't Hoen, supra note 21, at 31.
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environmental challenges, bureaucratic problems, and corruption in virtually
all of these countries.6 7 Moreover, because the Goldman Sachs study is based
on the latest demographic projections and a model of capital accumulation
and productivity growth, it may have been overly optimistic in assuming that
the BRIC countries will undertake "reasonably successful development"6s -
that is, these countries will continue to "maintain policies and develop
institutions that are supportive of growth."6 9 If the economies of these
countries slow down or collapse as a result of internal political unrests, major
reform failures, significant demographic changes, financial calamities, public
health crises, environmental disasters, or even civil or external wars, these
countries are very unlikely to overtake the world's leading developed
economies as the study has forecasted. The authors of the Goldman Sachs
study even concede that "there is a good chance that our projections are not
met, either through bad policy or bad luck."7' After all, that study was
originally titled Dreaming with BRICs, and the Goldman Sachs team
conceded "that dream may not become a reality."
Nevertheless, even if we discount the potential economic growth in these
countries, it is hard to ignore their impact on the international intellectual
property regime, especially when they team up to form a coalition. Such a
coalition, which will be described as "the BRICS coalition" throughout this
Article, will be similar to what Frederick Abbott has called the "Southern
Quad"72 or what Peter Drahos has termed the "Developing Country Quad."73
Just based on their total population, the size of their combined markets, and
the aggregation of technical, legal, and managerial expertise within those
countries, the BRICS coalition is likely to provide enough leverage to rival the
European Communities or the United States.
If the coalition is well built and maintained, it can even become an
effective counterweight to the trilateral cooperation among the European
67 For a discussion of the different challenges confronting the BRICS countries, see
Jack N. Behrman, Peak and Pits with the BRICs: Accommodations with the West, in EMERGING
ECONOMIES, supra note 13, at 513.
68 Wilson & Purushothaman, supra note 13, at 3.
69 Id. at 2.
70 Id.
7 Wilson et al., supra note 16, at 3.
72 Frederick M. Abbott, Toward a New Era of Objective Assessment in the Field of
TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of Multilateralism, 8 J. INT'L EcON. L. 77,
88 (2005). Notably, Professor Abbott did not include Russia in his discussion, because it was
not a WTO member. Id.
73 Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property
Standard-Setting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 784 (2002) [hereinafter Drahos, Developing
Countries]. Professor Drahos also excluded Russia. Id. Unlike Professor Abbott, however,
Professor Drahos included Nigeria, instead of South Africa, in the mix. Id. Although South
Africa is included in the BRICS acronym used throughout this Article, Nigeria remains of
great importance within the African continent. As Chris Alden noted: "Like its South African
counterpart, the Nigerian government harbours ambitions to take up the proposed African
permanent seat on the UN Security Council .... " CHRIS ALDEN, CHINA IN AFRICA: PARTNER,
COMPETITOR OR HEGEMON? 69 (2007). Likewise, in a recent report on the BRIC economies,
Jim O'Neill noted: "Nigeria is one country that deserves a special mention, and is certainly a
country that has captured my attention. With a population close to three times that of South
Africa, Nigeria's ability to deliver on our dream could be vital for the whole African continent."
BRICs AND BEYOND, supra note 14, at 6.
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Communities, Japan, and the United States, all of which were instrumental in
pushing for the adoption of the TRIPs Agreement.' This group of countries
also has been active in promoting the harmonization of the international
patent system,7 pushing most recently for the rather ill-advised proposal for
the adoption of the Substantive Patent Law Treaty.76 Even if the BRICS
coalition is unable to resist the push by this trilateral combination, the
countries can at least exploit strategically the growing rifts between and
among the European Communities, the United States, and Japan, 7 thus
enlarging the policy space of less developed countries. As John Odell noted, a
sophisticated negotiation strategy includes not only tactics for building
coalitions, but also tactics "for splitting rival coalitions ... and for defending
against efforts by outsiders to break one's own."78
In sum, it would not be far-fetched to advance the hypothesis that a
coalition made up of the BRICS countries can provide an effective
countervailing force against the continued push for stronger global
intellectual property standards by the European Communities and the United
States. 71 The resistance put up by this coalition may even result in a
negotiation deadlock that resembles the historic stalemate between developed
and less developed countries during the 1981 Diplomatic Conference in
Nairobi."° For commentators who have called for a "moratorium" on the
upward ratchet of global intellectual property standards, like Keith Maskus
and Jerome Reichman,8 ' a stalemate between developed and less developed
countries may be somewhat desirable. At the very least, the stalemate will
stop developed countries from pushing for higher intellectual property
74 See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 35, at 363.
75 For information about trilateral cooperation between the European Patent Office,
the Japanese Patent Office, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, see Website of the
Trilateral Co-operation, www.trilateral.net (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
76 For a recent critique of the proposed Substantive Patent Law Treaty, see generally
Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus:
Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85 (2007).
77 See AMRITA NARLIKAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
BARGAINING COALITIONS IN THE GATT AND WTO 200 (2003) (noting that "[t]he Cairns
Group utilized the rift within the US-EC with great skill"); Rolland, supra note 59, at 503
(noting the "strategic exploitation of rifts between the United States, the EU, and Japan");
Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 369, 406-08 (2006)
(noting the need to "explore the tension between the European Communities and the United
States").
78 John S. Odell, Introduction to NEGOTIATING TRADE, supra note 22, at 1, 13.
79 Cf. Mark Kobayashi-Hillary, Introduction to BUILDING A FUTURE WITH BRICs,
supra note 16, at 1, 3 ("If the BRICs were to join together and form a unique trading bloc of
countries that are not even geographical neighbors, but complementary in other ways, then
they could create a formidable rival to the present world-order and established power
structures.").
so See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 35, at 357.
81 See Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 3, 36-39
(Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (calling for a "moratorium on stronger
international intellectual property standards").
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standards that have yet to be proven economically beneficial for the less
developed world.2
II. THE BRICS COALITION
While there is no doubt that the BRICS countries will be economically
powerful in the future, the effectiveness of the BRICS coalition is not
dependent on the future economic strength of its members or the validity of
the economic projections made by the Goldman Sachs global economists or
other analysts. To illustrate why the BRICS coalition would succeed at
present in promoting greater access to essential medicines in the less
developed world, consider Brazil's effective use of its threat to issue
compulsory licenses of patented pharmaceuticals. Such a threat has enabled
the country to reduce the price of HIV/AIDS antiretroviral drugs by up to 75
per cent per person.s3 Unlike the vague threats made by other less developed
countries, which are usually just "rhetorical call[s] for distributive justice," 4
Brazil's threats are fairly credible.
The credibility of Brazil's threats can be attributed to three preconditions
that may be absent from other less developed countries. First, the country has
an indigenous capacity to develop and manufacture pharmaceuticals, which in
turn has created "a strong negotiating capacity for obtaining low prices from
patent holders." 5 This manufacturing capacity is important, because a
country cannot force pharmaceutical firms to import drugs against their
wishes or to devote resources to develop treatments for neglected diseases that
affect its population. Indeed, the introduction of the proposed article 31bis
was a direct response to the ineffectiveness of the use of compulsory licenses
to address public health crises in countries with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacity.8 6
For these countries, the nationalization of foreign pharmaceutical firms
seems to be the only option, assuming that foreign manufacturing facilities
are already present in the country. That option, however, is highly
undesirable. While such a move may provide short-term gains in the supply
of pharmaceuticals, and perhaps even the transfer of drug-related
technologies, the wildly unpopular use of national expropriation measures
would result in long-term sacrifices, such as a loss of foreign direct
investment, a tarnished international reputation, and potential trade
sanctions and embargoes. In fact, these measures are so unpopular that rights
holders and developed countries have described compulsory licensing as a
82 See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 7, at 897-99 (discussing
the need for undertaking empirical research to determine whether the additional intellectual
property protection is needed in the first place).
8 Pedro Roffe et al., From Paris to Doha: The WTO Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ACCESS TO MEDICINES 9, 15 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006).
84 NARLIKAR, supra note 77, at 57.
85 Joan Rovira, Creating and Promoting Domestic Drug Manufacturing Capacities: A
Solution for Developing Countries, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 83, at 227, 236.
86 See generally Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 7, at 872-86
(tracing the development of proposed article 31bis of the TRIPs Agreement).
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form of "expropriation" of intellectual property rights to underscore their
strong disapproval. s7
Second, Brazil contains a lucrative middle class market that multinational
pharmaceutical firms cannot afford to lose or alienate. Compared to other
less developed countries, Brazil "is less dependent on the U.S. for... a market
for its own exported products." 8 Indeed, studies have shown that the
following conditions are crucial for countries to become internally competitive
pharmaceutical manufacturers:
* gross domestic product (GDP) greater than about
US$100 billion;
* population greater than about 100 million;
* sufficient numbers of the population enrolled in
secondary and tertiary education;
* competitiveness index (UNIDO) greater than about 0.15;
and
" a net positive pharmaceutical balance of trade. 9
Because the markets in less developed countries are usually very small, it
may be virtually unprofitable to develop a local industry that is primarily
restricted to the domestic market.9° Even when the markets of several less
developed countries are aggregated to provide economies of scale and scope,
as permitted under the proposed article 31bis(3) of the TRIPs Agreement,
there is no guarantee that the combined market would generate enough
purchasing power to make the development of an indigenous pharmaceutical
industry attractive. 9'
To make things worse for many less developed countries, the lack of
economies of scale or scope has resulted in very high costs of drug
development, which includes the costs of clinical studies that may be needed
to prove the therapeutic effect of a drug. While large generic manufacturers
are able to afford costly bioequivalence studies,92 the costs of these studies can
87 See Drahos, Developing Countries, supra note 73, at 769 ("For the United States,
developing country proposals for exclusive compulsory licensing amounted to little more than
expropriation of U.S. intellectual property rights.").
88 Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Distributive Politics and International
Institutions: The Case of Drugs, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 21, 44 (2004).
89 Rovira, supra note 85, at 234.
90 See id. at 229 (noting that a limited market size "might make unprofitable a local
industry restricted to the domestic market").
91 See Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic
Considerations, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 563, 568 (2002) ("[P]urchasing power, even if aggregated
across a number of markets, may not be enough to make drug development attractive.").
92 As the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act stated:
A drug shall be considered to be bioequivalent to a listed drug if-
(i) the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a significant
difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug when
administered at the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar
experimental conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses; or
(ii) the extent of absorption of the drug does not show a significant difference
from the extent of absorption of the listed drug when administered at the same
molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions
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be prohibitively high for small and midsized firms. "A study in Colombia [for
example] estimated that the requirement of bioequivalence studies for anti-
hypertensive and anti-inflammatory drugs would increase the price of
domestically manufactured products by a percentage of between 46 and 61
per cent."93 A recent study presented at a World Bank forum also noted a lack
of evidence to suggest that domestic production will necessarily reduce price
and improve the quality of and access to medicines. 94
Finally, Brazil, or at least the part of the country where drugs are to be
manufactured, is not as vulnerable to development-related problems as many
other less developed countries. Although the quality of its manufacturing
practices is not as high as that of, say, India, Brazil possesses conditions that
are conducive to good manufacturing practices, including the "availability of
special technologies, reliable supplies of high-quality raw materials,
dependable provision of top-quality water, electricity, gas and other utilities
... [and] sufficient human resources, such as experts in pharmaceutical
development, quality assurance and regulatory processes." 9' Regulatory
processes are particularly important, because they can affect whether the
available drugs are safe and can perform their intended functions. In many
less developed countries, insufficient regulatory capacity has resulted in a high
percentage of drugs failing quality control tests as well as the wide availability
of counterfeit drugs. 96 While drugs may be more accessible and sold at a
much lower price, people continue to suffer, innocent lives are lost, the
country's labor and economic outputs remain low, and, the worst of all,
healthy people become needlessly sick and therefore have their lives
threatened.
Although the above discussion focuses mainly on Brazil, the same
arguments can be extended to other BRICS countries, each of which has raw
materials, technical capacity, manufacturing conditions, and a sufficiently
in either a single dose or multiple doses and the difference from the listed drug in
the rate of absorption of the drug is intentional, is reflected in its proposed
labeling, is not essential to the attainment of effective body drug concentrations
on chronic use, and is considered medically insignificant for the drug.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B) (2004).
93 Rovira, supra note 85, at 234.
94 Id. (citing W.A. KAPLAN & R. LAING, LOCAL PRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICALS:
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES: AN OVERVIEW OF KEY CONCEPTS, ISSUES AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH (World Bank, HNP Discussion Papers, 2005),
siteresources.worldbank.org/HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/Resources/281627-
1095698140167/KaplanLocalProductionFinal.pdf).
95 Rovira, supra note 85, at 233 (quoting World Health Organization, Manufacture of
Antiretrovirals in Developing Countries and Challenges for the Future, at 1, EB114/15 (Apr. 29,
2004), available at www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/EB114/B1l4 15-en.pdf).
96 See GIAN LUCA BURCI & CLAUDE-HENRI VIGNES, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
188 (2004) ("[Eiven if drugs are available, weak drug regulation may mean that they are
substandard or counterfeit."); MUSUNGU ET AL., supra note 9, at 28 ("Many developing
countries ... lack the facilities and expertise needed to review the safety, efficacy and quality of
drugs destined for their national markets, and remain dependent on foreign authorities to set
the necessary standards and do the necessary testing."); Nitya Nanda & Ritu Lodha, Making
Essential Medicines Affordable to the Poor, 20 WIs. INT'L L.J. 581, 586 (2002) ("Surveys from a
number of developing countries show that between 10 and 20 percent of sampled drugs fail
quality control tests.").
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large market. Thus, if the threats made by these countries are combined, the
threat will become even more credible. Even if the conditions in some of the
BRICS countries are inadequate, the others may possess complementary
conditions that help alleviate the shortcomings of the affected countries. 97 In
short, the implications for these threats on the international intellectual
property regime will be very significant.
In addition, these countries will have the capacity to provide generic
versions of many of the drugs needed by both the BRICS countries and other
less developed countries. They also will be able to supply active
pharmaceutical ingredients that are necessary for the production of generic
and on-patent drugs in the less developed world. 9 As Joan Rovira observed,
the production of these ingredients "is concentrated in the industrialized
world and in a few emerging countries." 99 Indeed, China is currently the
leading producer of these ingredients. Other less developed countries that
have the capacity to do so "include India,... Thailand, Egypt, Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina and, to some extent, Yugoslavia and Turkey.""° ° The rest of the less
developed world either consists of formulators or have insufficient or no
manufacturing capacity.
Thus, in a face-off between developed countries and the BRICS coalition,
or between developed and less developed countries, the impact of the BRICS
coalition on the access-to-medicines debate is likely to be considerable. To be
certain, the patent-based pharmaceutical manufacturers could still focus on
the developed country markets, which is very substantial and will remain
protected by strong intellectual property laws. However, the lack of
protection in the less developed world and the possibility for generic drugs to
enter and then take over some developed country markets are likely to render
this strategy highly ineffective. Moreover, if one believes the pharmaceutical
industry's claim that the foreign market is of paramount importance to the
industry,'° a united front set up by the BRICS countries and other less
developed markets may be able to threaten the survival of major
97 See Dimitry Ponomarev, Dreaming with BRICs, in BUILDING A FUTURE WITH BRICs,
supra note 16, at 87, 89 (noting that the four BRIC countries "perfectly complement each
other").
98 See Karin Timmermans, Ensuring Access to Medicines in 2005 and Beyond, in
NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 83, at 41, 42 (noting that "Indian companies are major
suppliers of generic medicines and of the active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) necessary
for their production to other developing and developed countries").
99 Rovira, supra note 85, at 231.
100 Id.
10] See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The Need for
Improved Patent Protection Worldwide, 2 J.L. & TECH. 307, 307 (1987) ("Whether [the
commitment of America's research-based pharmaceutical companies] can continue depends
greatly upon the extent to which foreign governments allow innovators to be rewarded for
their inventiveness, monetary investment, and intellectual labor."); Judy Slinn, Research and
Development in the UK Pharmaceutical Industry from the Nineteenth Century to the 1960s, in
DRUGS AND NARCOTICS IN HISTORY 168, 168 (Roy Porter & Mikul Teich eds., 1995) (noting
that "new drugs must be sold worldwide, since no company can fully exploit a patented
product, recouping its research and development costs solely in its own home market, even in
the two largest national markets, the USA and Japan"), quoted in GRAHAM DUTFIELD,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE SCIENCE INDUSTRIES: A 20TH CENTURY
HISTORY 108 (2003).
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pharmaceutical manufacturers in the developed world to the point that it
would require them to alter their domestic and international lobbying
strategies.
III. PARTIAL BRICS ALLIANCES
Although the BRICS coalition will provide the needed resistance to the
growing protection of pharmaceutical products, the maintenance of such a
coalition over a sustained period of time proves to be a major challenge. As
noted above, each of the BRICS countries is currently confronted with many
internal problems-or, as one corporate advisor puts it, many "bricks" within
the BRICS.10 2 In addition, the levels of protection vary according to the
relevant economic and technological sectors. The stakeholders in the
intellectual property system in these countries are also quite different.
Even more problematic, these countries, due to their vast sizes and
complexities, have experienced very uneven economic development. As two
World Bank researchers recently observed in the cases of China and India:
Concerns are being expressed about the distributional impacts of
the growth processes in both countries. The domestic debate
about growth-promoting reforms has become increasingly
contentious. It is widely felt that the gains from growth have
been spread too unevenly, with some segments of the populations
left behind in relative and even absolute terms. Yes, the Giants
are awakening from their economic slumber, but they still are
only partially awake in that segments of their societies remain
(relatively and absolutely) dormant.103
In the case of China, there remain widespread disparities at both the
regional and sectoral levels, and these disparities have made it virtually
impossible for China to adopt a nationwide intellectual property policy that
would work well for the country's different parts.1'0 With respect to India,
Kamal Nath, India's minister of commerce and industry, has made a similar
observation: "[T]here are many Indias, and some of them are changing faster
than others, depending on the capacities of individual segments of society to
absorb and utilize change.""5 Likewise, Amartya Sen noted, "The frustrating
thing about India is that whatever you can rightly say about India, the
102 Mark Kobayashi-Hillary, Conclusion, in BUILDING A FUTURE WITH BRICs, supra
note 16, at 185, 186.
103 Shubham Chaudhuri & Martin Ravallion, Partially Awakened Giants: Uneven
Growth in China and India, in DANCING WITH GIANTS: CHINA, INDIA, AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 175, 175-76 (L. Alan Winters & Shahid Yusuf eds., 2007) [hereinafter DANCING
WITH GIANTS].
104 See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173, 198-209 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007); see also
Keith E. Maskus et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development in China, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS PROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH
295, 322-23 (Carsten Fink & Keith E, Maskus eds., 2005) (noting the "large regional
differences in the shares of R&D performed by various organizations" in China).
1o5 NATH, supra note 44, at 151.
BRICS ALLIANCES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
opposite is also true."' °6 Indeed, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa are not that
much different from China and India, because they also experience wide
disparities in wealth, resources, economic development, socio-economic
barriers, and research-and-development capabilities.
Within the pharmaceutical sector, manufacturers within each BRICS
country may have very different interests and goals. For example, as Brook
Baker pointed out in his comments on this article at the Symposium, while
India is the world's leading generic producer and is eager to export its
pharmaceuticals, Brazil has a relatively large internal market and has
occasionally supplied HIV/AIDS antiretrovirals to other less developed
countries.0 7 Although China has yet to be as aggressive as India in exporting
drugs or as successful as Brazil in promoting public health within the country,
it already is the world's largest producer of active pharmaceutical ingredients
and is likely to be a very important player in the generic market. As a result,
the intellectual property position taken by each BRICS country will vary
according to the benefits accrued to its pharmaceutical sectors.
When intellectual property issues are linked to trade, new issues may also
arise.' 8 As these new issues are being incorporated into the larger policy
debate, the dynamics of the debate are likely to be very different. For
example, the new issues may enlarge the existing regional or sectoral
disparities within the country. The arrival of new players and issues also
precipitate new disputes among the stakeholders while aggravating
preexisting ones that have already been brewing before new issues are being
incorporated into the debate.
Eventually, the widely divergent interests within each BRICS country and
the different priorities the country places on these interests will make it very
difficult for the BRICS countries to build a successful coalition. As Professor
Cho noted, shortly after the proven success of the G-20 during the Canctin
Ministerial:
106 ROBYN MEREDITH, THE ELEPHANT AND THE DRAGON: THE RISE OF INDIA AND
CHINA AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR ALL OF US 126 (2007).
107 Thanks to Brook Baker for providing detailed and informative comments on the
development of the pharmaceutical sectors in the BRICS countries.
108 See Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, supra note 50, at 16-17.
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One could not confidently predict that [the collective stance
taken by the G-20] will remain as solid in the future as it was in
Canciin. Interests of [these countries] are not homogenous. For
instance, while India still wants to protect domestic agricultural
industries, Brazil, a member of the Cairns Group consisting of
agricultural product exporters, wants to further liberalize trade in
this area. Moreover, we witnessed other groups of developing
countries, such as the G-33, which advocated the inclusion of
strategic products and a special safeguard mechanism in the
agriculture negotiation; the coalition of the African Union, the
African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, and the LDCs ... which
collectively want the preservation of current preferential
treatment in addition to G-33 demands. 0 9
Professor Cho's skepticism was well supported by the history of less
developed countries, which hitherto have only limited success in using
coalition-building efforts to increase their bargaining leverage. As Professor
Abbott reminded us:
Over the past 50 years, there have been a number of efforts to
achieve solidarity or common positions among developing
countries in international forums. At the broad multilateral level
there was (and are) the Group of 77, and the movement for a New
International Economic Order. At the regional level, the Andean
Pact in the early 1970s developed a rather sophisticated common
plan to address technology and IP issues (ie Decisions 84 and 85).
Yet these efforts were largely unsuccessful in shifting the balance
of negotiating leverage away from developed countries. In fact,
developing country common efforts to reform the Paris
Convention in the late 1970s and early 1980s are routinely cited
as the triggering event for movement of intellectual property
negotiations to the GATT. n°
Their lack of success was perhaps caused by the fact that these coalitions
were usually too ambitious; they were set up to include a broad mandate,
diverse membership, complex issues, and incompatible interests. As Amrita
Narlikar has shown, issue-based coalitions work best for small and very
specialized economies with common profiles and interests, but not as well for
109 Cho, supra note 52, at 236 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, Sonia Rolland observed
the different positions on agriculture taken by Brazil and India:
Brazil had a liberal approach to further its export interest, whereas India
maintained conservative positions with respect to liberalization of the agriculture
sector and had a protectionist stance. Brazil's shift toward a more aggressive
stance on agriculture corresponded to its liberalization of the agricultural sector
and the increased pressure by domestic investors on the government on this issue
both in negotiating rounds and in dispute settlement (particularly in disputes
with Europe and the United States).
Rolland, supra note 59, at 495.
110 Frederick Abbott, The Future of IPRs in the Multilateral Trading System, in
TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND
SUSTAINABILITY 36, 42 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter Abbott, Future of
IPRs].
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larger, more diverse, and often internally-conflicting economies, like those of
the BRICS countries."' Such coalitions also do not work well for a large bloc
of less developed countries that have various strengths, sizes, and interests
and that are only linked together in an ad hoc fashion."'
The lack of success by less developed countries to build or maintain
coalitions can be further attributed to their "highE] dependen[ce] on the
developed countries as the source of capital, whether it is provided through
the IMF or World Bank, or through investment bankers and securities
exchanges.""3 Such independence was further aggravated by the lack of
stability in the economies of less developed countries-for example, in India
during the TRIPs negotiations"4 and in South America during the negotiation
of the draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology."'
In light of the lack of likelihood of success in building a sustained
coalition among the BRICS countries, this Part proposes a more realistic
option: the creation of alliances between some of the BRICS countries"6 and,
more importantly, between less developed countries and one or more of the
BRICS countries. These alliances will be described throughout the Article as
"partial BRICS alliances." Although most of the arguments concerning partial
BRICS alliances are valid for either type of alliance, this Article focuses mainly
on the latter, because those alliances are more important to promoting access
to essential medicines in countries with insufficient or no manufacturing
capacity.
While each partial alliance does not provide the same bargaining leverage
as the BRICS coalition, it still possesses a number of attractive features. By
teaming up other less developed countries with one or more of the BRICS
countries, the group will have leverage that does not exist for each less
developed country alone. The costs of maintaining a partial alliance is also
significantly lower than what would be required to maintain a complete
coalition. Moreover, like the BRICS coalition, partial BRICS alliances can be
used strategically to help less developed countries develop their own voice. If
multiple partial alliances are set up, these alliances, partial as they are, may
result in the creation of a web of alliances that has immense synergistic
potential.
Indeed, the rationales behind the effectiveness of these partial alliances
are quite similar to those behind the effectiveness of the BRICS coalition.
Each of the BRICS countries will have the raw materials and technical
capacity needed to develop and manufacture many on-patent or generic
pharmaceuticals demanded by other less developed countries. They also
III See NARLIKAR, supra note 77, at 176.
112 See Rolland, supra note 59, at 510 (noting that "groups of members sharing common
profiles and common interests . . . are better candidates for institutional and legal support
than ad hoc issue-based coalitions").
113 Abbott, Future of IPRs, supra note 110, at 42.
114 See NATH, supra note 44, at 49-61 (discussing the economic problems and reforms
in India in the early 1990s).
115 See Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 34 OHio N.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008).
u6 For a discussion of collaborative initiatives between the BRIC countries, see
Behrman, supra note 67, at 528-31.
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possess the market conditions for the development of a regional, pro-
development, or pro-poor pharmaceutical industry. Unlike the major
pharmaceutical manufacturers in the developed world, manufacturers in the
BRICS countries, like Ranbaxy or Dr. Reddy's Laboratories in India or
Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceutical in China, are less likely to be bound by a
business model that focuses on the development of a blockbuster drug.1 1 7 As a
result, pharmaceutical manufacturers in the BRICS countries may be able to
devote more energy to the development of drugs for neglected diseases."'
These companies may also be more eager to develop traditional medicines or
drugs that are compatible with the use of such alternative medicines.'1 9 Thus,
by linking the BRICS countries with other less developed countries that have
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity, the partial alliances will make the
indigenous development of pharmaceuticals feasible and financially attractive.
They will enable a more efficient and effective supply of the needed medicines.
If regional alliances are set up-such as through regional economic
integration; the institution of regional organizations, mutual recognition
systems, or procurement systems; the facilitation of regional cooperation in
research and development; or the creation of regional competition
enforcement mechanisms-there may be even more benefits.12 ° As Sisule
Musungu and others have noted in a South Centre study:
From an economic and public health standpoint, a regional
approach can provide incentives for establishing or developing
regional pharmaceutical production and help expand research
capabilities. In addition, higher effective demand for the same
medicines due to climatic conditions and other geographical
reasons, as well as cultural aspects, will result in lower consumer
drug prices due to increased economies of scale in procurement
and distribution. Other important benefits include: the costs
associated with adapting medicines to the region may be
offset/lowered due to increased economies of scale; stronger local
technological capacities/domestic innovation resulting from the
pooling of adequate resources including financing, and human
capital and physical capital will be stimulated. Finally, a regional
approach can also help to improve cross-border disease control. 2
117 See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 7, at 842-43.
118 For a discussion of neglected diseases, see sources cited id. at 841-43.
119 See id. at 900 (noting the importance of exploring alternative proposals that "can be
compatible with existing treatments in less developed countries, such as the use of traditional
medicine"); Obijiofor Aginam, From the Core to the Peripheries: Multilateral Governance of
Malaria in a Multi-Cultural World, 3 CHi. J. INT'L L. 87, 93 (2002) ("Ethnomedical
knowledge of plants by indigenous people across societies and cultures has 'long served as [a]
crucial source[] of medicines either directly as [a source of] therapeutic agents, as [a] starting
point[] for the elaboration of more complex semi-synthetic compounds or as synthetic
compounds.'"); Nanda & Lodha, supra note 96, at 586 ("In developing countries, up to 80
percent of the population relies on traditional medicine to meet its health-care needs. Such
medicine is not only affordable, but it is also widely available and trusted.").
120 For a comprehensive discussion of these regional initiatives, see MUSUNGU ET AL.,
supra note 9.
121 Id. at 35-36.
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In addition, as Robert Bird and Dan Cahoy pointed out recently, the
creation of alliances among less developed countries will help many less
developed countries combat the external pressure each country will face on a
one-on-one basis from the European Communities, the United States, or
other powerful trading partners. As Professors Bird and Cahoy noted:
Through the use of a collective action mechanism, it may be
possible for a country with a certain level of immunity to share
the protection with one or several countries more susceptible to
FDI economic retribution. The use of coordinated behavior may
bring about a more equitable result, so long as one is aware of the
legal limits of such mechanisms and the anticoordination
strategies that may be employed by opponents of the system.
In another article, they also acknowledged that the BRIC countries will have a
good opportunity to become significant players if waivers based on the
proposed article 31bis become more widely applied."'
Moreover, many BRICS countries-notably Brazil and India, and
gradually China-have been active participants of the WTO dispute
settlement process. 124 As of January 1, 2008, Brazil has served as a
complainant in twenty-three disputes (including one on patent rights in
inventions made with U.S. federal assistance). 25 It was also a respondent in
fourteen disputes (including one on the local working requirement in the
Brazilian patent system)Y.2 6 Likewise, India has served as a complainant in
seventeen disputes and as a respondent in nineteen disputes (including two
disputes on the mailbox system). 27 Within a short span of less than six years,
China has already served as a complainant in two disputes and as a
respondent in eight disputes (including the most recent one over intellectual
property enforcement). 12  By virtue of their repeated participation in the
WTO dispute settlement process, Brazil, India, and China will have
considerable knowledge and expertise that can be shared with other less
developed countries. By making strategic use of such knowledge and
expertise, countries within the coalition or partial alliances can better defend
their laws and practices before a WTO dispute settlement panel, explore the
122 Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign
Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 283, 317 (2008)
[hereinafter Bird & Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing].
123 See Bird & Cahoy, The Emerging BRIC Economies, supra note 20, at 421 (footnote
omitted).
124 For a detailed assessment of the participation of Brazil and India in the WTO
dispute settlement process, see William J. Davey, The "TO Dispute Settlement System: The
First Ten Years, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 40-45 (2005) [hereinafter Davey, WTO Dispute
Settlement System].
125 See Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States-US Patents Code,
WT/DS224/1 (Feb. 7, 2001).
126 See Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil-Measures Affecting
Patent Protection, WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000).
127 See Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS5O/R (1997); Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical andAgricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS79/R (1998).
128 See Request for Consultations by the United States, China-Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 16, 2007).
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flexibilities provided by the TRIPs Agreement, or even challenge non-
compliant laws in developed countries.
Finally, if these partial BRICS alliances are supported by framework
agreements that include detailed and concrete technology transfer provisions,
those alliances may satisfy the needs of many less developed countries. Since
their emergence as independent countries after the Second World War, less
developed countries have made repeated calls for the transfer of technology
from their developed trading partners. These calls, unfortunately, have been
met with limited success and usually result in the creation of vague, hortatory,
and often preambular language in international intellectual property, trade,
and investment agreements.
Article 66 of the TRIPs Agreement, for example, requires developed
countries to provide incentives for their businesses and institutions to help
create "a sound and viable technological base" in least developed countries by
promoting and encouraging transfer of technology. 2 9 However, it is unclear
how least developed countries can enforce article 66, even with the assistance
of the mandatory WTO dispute settlement process. Likewise, "[a]lthough the
Doha Declaration is full of verbal commitments and plans for capacity
building, it is silent about how to fund the ambitious technical assistance
programs. Furthermore, its legal nature as a 'work program' is vague." 30
During the discussion of solutions to implementing paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration, some less developed countries underscored the importance
of building local manufacturing capacity.3 Their demands eventually created
tension within the less developed world. While the African Group "believe[d]
that the ultimate solution to the paragraph 6 problem [wa]s to build domestic
manufacturing capacity and that this should be explicitly agreed and
mentioned in the solution,"'32 other less developed countries, like Brazil and
India, already had manufacturing capacity and therefore believed otherwise.
Fortunately for the less developed world, the two groups of countries were
able to set aside their differences and join together to battle the developed
world. Their cooperation made great pragmatic sense: countries lacking in
manufacturing capacity are likely to continue to import new drugs from
countries like Brazil, India, and China for a number of years before they
develop their own production capacity. 33
Compared to the TRIPs Agreement or other existing arrangement in the
international trading system, partial BRICS alliances are likely to result in the
transfer of more technology from the BRICS countries to other less developed
countries. Because of the lower overall economic disparity between the
BRICS countries and other less developed countries and the strong likelihood
that a large segment of population in the BRICS countries live in similar
129 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 66(2).
130 Cho, supra note 52, at 226 (emphasis omitted).
131 See Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade
and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 317, 334 (2005) [hereinafter Abbott,
WTO Medicines Decision].
132 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights, Communication from
Kenya, the Coordinator of the African Group, Elements of a Paragraph 6 Solution,
IP/C/W/389, 15(a) (Nov. 14, 2002).
W Cf Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra note 131, at 334.
BRICS ALLIANCES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
conditions as the conditions of those living in other less developed countries,
BRICS countries will more readily provide assistance to other less developed
countries-either because they understand better the plight of their less
developed partners or because the BRICS government leaders have to respond
to political constituencies that are sympathetic to the plight of other less
developed countries.'34
So far, there have been only "a few reported initiatives on South-South
technology transfer."'35 While Thailand offered to help Ghana and Zimbabwe
to set up factories to produce HIV/AIDS antiretrovirals,'3 6 "Brazil ... offered a
cooperation agreement, including technology transfer, to developing countries
for the production of generic ARV drugs."
3 7
In recent years, China has also been very active in initiating trade
agreements with members of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations), with the goal of creating the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area. 3 '
China is also exploring greater economic cooperation with India, with the
hope of eventually developing a regional trade agreement. 3 9 In addition, it
has a growing presence in Africa. As Chris Alden noted:
Two-way trade, which stood at less than US$10 billion in 2000,
had surged to over US$50 billion by the end of 2006, making
China the continent's third-largest trading partner after the
United States and France. In the same period China's share of
Africa's exports jumped from 2.6 to over 9.3 per cent and it has
become the leading trading partner for several of the continent's
commodity-based economies. 4 °
These efforts have earned China considerable goodwill and soft power in
Africa.' Some commentators, nevertheless, have questioned the underlying
intentions of these efforts,4 2 especially with respect to "resource acquisition
and commercial opportunism."" Others have also pointed out that many
China-initiated agreements did not seek to increase the collective bargaining
134 As discussed below, nongovernmental organizations in developed countries may
serve similar functions. However, from the standpoint of domestic policymaking, a push by
domestic constituencies is usually more persuasive than a push by nongovernmental
organizations headquartered outside the country.
135 Rovira, supra note 85, at 235.
136 See id.
137 't Hoen, supra note 22, at 32.
138 See C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD
NEEDS TO KNOW Now ABOUT THE EMERGING SUPERPOWER 114 (2006).
139 See Jim Yardley, Indian Leader in China Urges Closer Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2008, at A8. For interesting discussions of Indo-China relations, see JAIRAM RAMESH,
MAKING SENSE OF CHINDIA: REFLECTIONS ON CHINA AND INDIA (2006); WAHEGURU PAL
SINGH SIDHU & JING DONG YUAN, CHINA AND INDIA: COOPERATION OR CONFLICT? (2003).
140 ALDEN, supra note 73, at 8.
141 See JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, CHARM OFFENSIVE: How CHINA'S SOFT POWER IS
TRANSFORMING THE WORLD (2007).
142 For a discussion of China's activities in Africa, see CHRIS ALDEN, CHINA IN AFRICA
(2007); HARRY G. BROADMAN, AFRICA'S SILK ROAD: CHINA AND INDIA'S NEW ECONOMIC
FRONTIER (2007).
14 ALDEN, supra note 73, at 8.
370 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 34 NOS. 2&3 2008
position in the less developed world, but rather sought to respond to China's
WTO accession agreements."
In sum, partial BRICS alliances, if structured properly, will possess many
attractive features. They not only will provide less developed countries with
the additional support against developed countries, but they will also help
ensure greater access to essential medicines in these countries. By helping
less developed countries build their capacity through technology transfer and
technical assistance, these partial alliances may also provide a long-term
solution to the access-to-medicines problem-a solution that has been craved
by the African Group from the beginning of the Doha Development Round of
Trade Negotiations ("Doha Round").
IV. COORDINATION STRATEGIES
To highlight the role that the BRICS coalition or partial BRICS alliances
can play in the international intellectual property debate, this Part discusses
four coordination strategies through which less developed countries can work
together to strengthen their collective bargaining position, influence
negotiation outcomes, and promote effective and democratic decisionmaking
in the international intellectual property regime. These strategies include (1)
the initiation of South-South alliances; (2) the facilitation of North-South
cooperation; (3) joint participation in the WTO dispute settlement process;
and (4) the development of regional or pro-development fora. These
strategies will allow less developed countries to shape a pro-development
agenda, articulate more coherent positions, or even enable these countries to
establish a united negotiating front. The coalition-building strategies will also
help these countries establish a powerful voice in the international debates on
public health, intellectual property, and international trade. In doing so, less
developed countries will be able to develop treaties and policies that promote
access to essential medicines in the less developed world. Because these four
strategies are not intended to be mutually exclusive, countries seeking to
strengthen their bargaining position are encouraged to maximize the impact
by combining these strategies together.
Collective bargaining is particularly important for four reasons. First, the
WTO has dominated current international intellectual property discussions,
and group representation of less developed countries is particularly deficient
in this international trading body. As Sonia Rolland recently noted:
144 As one commentator noted: "China . . . appears to be developing an interesting
strategy consisting of pressing for regional free trade agreements, not so much as a way to
improve its bargaining capacity, but rather to foster its case for market economy status, a
crucial element in anti-dumping actions." Rolland, supra note 59, at 498.
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Although the organization operates on a one-country-one-vote
basis and on a consensus mechanism (which formally also
considers members on an equal basis), the reality of negotiations
and of the decision-making process is much more complex and
susceptible to the arbitrage of economic power.... Despite their
increased number and activity in the WTO, developing countries
still find themselves in a relatively marginalized position and
experience difficulties in linking their development agenda to
multilateral trade negotiations.'45
Second, there is a rare, unprecedented opportunity for less developed
countries to reshape the intellectual property debate. At the recent WTO
Ministerial Conferences in Doha, Cancfin, and Hong Kong, these countries
have built a considerable momentum in pushing for reforms that would
recalibrate the balance of the international trading system. During the
Cancdin Ministerial, for example, the African Group and least developed
countries together "accounted for two-thirds of the proposals synthesized in
the Chairman's document."'4 6 Greater collaboration, therefore, would help
less developed countries take advantage of the ongoing momentum while
protecting the gains they already obtained in recent negotiations.
Third, which is related to the second, greater collaboration among less
developed countries is needed in light of the impending closure of the Doha
Round. Without the urgency brought about by September 11 and the anthrax
attacks and the United States' general interest in having greater cooperation
with the less developed world, one has to wonder whether the Doha Round
could be negotiated as far as it got.'47 If less developed countries need to
protect the gains they made in the Doha Round, they need to increase their
collective bargaining leverage.
Finally, the international intellectual property regime has become
increasingly complex, creating what I have termed the "international
intellectual property regime complex." 4 ' Because of its complexity, this
conglomerate regime is likely to harm less developed countries more than they
harm developed countries. As Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs described,
the growing proliferation of international regulatory institutions with
overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries has helped powerful
states to preserve their dominance in the international arena.'4 9 The growing
complexities have also upset the existing coalition dynamics between actors
and institutions within the international trading system, thus threatening to
145 Rolland, supra note 59, at 483; accord NARLIKAR, supra note 77, at 2 (noting that
"GATI officials reiterated the operation of'consensus'-based decision-making procedures, and
refused to acknowledge the existence of some well-entrenched coalitions").
146 Rolland, supra note 59, at 503.
147 See, e.g., Louise Amoore et al., Series Preface to NARLIKAR, supra note 77, at xiii
(noting that the launch of the Doha Round was "assisted to a large degree by the conciliatory
international political climate that followed the September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York
and Washington").
148 Symposium, The International Intellectual Property Regime Complex, 2007 MICH.
ST. L. REv. 1.
149 See Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political
Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. RaV. 595 (2007).
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reduce the bargaining power and influence the less developed world has
obtained through past coalition-building initiatives. 5 '
A. SOUTH-SOUTH ALLIANCES
Since the failure of the Canciin Ministerial, the United States has initiated
a divide-and-conquer strategy that seeks to reward countries that are willing
to work with the United States while undermining efforts by Brazil, India, and
other G-20 members to establish a united negotiating front for less developed
countries.' Although the United States has begun negotiating new bilateral
and regional trade agreements before the failed ministerial conference, these
agreements have been increasingly used as a means to isolate uncooperative
less developed countries. As Robert Zoellick, the former United States Trade
Representative, wrote in the Financial Times shortly after the conference, the
United States will separate the can-do countries from the won't-do countries
and "will move towards free trade with [only] can-do countries."'52
This isolation strategy was not new; it was used by the United States to
increase its bargaining leverage during the TRIPs negotiations. When the
TRIPs Agreement was being negotiated, the United States used section 301
sanctions to isolate major opposition countries, like Argentina, Brazil, India,
Japan, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand.' 3 South Korea, for example, was
threatened with sanctions for inadequate protection for computer programs,
chemicals, and pharmaceuticals and in the copyright, patent, and trademark
areas. As Jayashree Watal recounted:
An important subsidiary objective ... was to separate Korea from
joining developing country opposition to the GATT initiative on
IPRs. Korea was a soft target not only because of its dependence
on exports and more particularly on the US, but because it had
already reached a certain level of development and could make
the transition to strengthened IPR protection more easily.'5 4
Watal's observation concurred with that of Clayton Yeutter, the former United
States Trade Representative, who "stated publicly that the Section 301
investigation of South Korea in 1985 was intended to send a message to GATT
Members."'55 Indeed, five of the ten hardliner countries that refused to
expand the GATT mandate to cover substantive intellectual property issues-
Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia-found their name on the
United States Trade Representative's Section 301 Priority Watch List or
Watch List.'
5 6
If less developed countries are to counterbalance the United States'
divide-and-conquer strategy, lest more TRIPs-plus standards be developed at
150 See Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, supra note 50, at 17-18.
151 See Yu, TRIPS and its Discontents, supra note 77, at 403.
152 Robert B. Zoellick, America Will Not Wait for the Won't-Do Countries, FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 22, 2003, at 23.
15 See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 35, at 413.
154 WATAL, supra note 23, at 18 (footnote omitted).
155 Drahos, Developing Countries, supra note 73, at 774.
156 Id.
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both the multilateral and regional levels, they need to initiate a combine-and-
conquer strategy. Simply put, they need to build more coalitions within the
less developed world-such as the BRICS coalition, partial BRICS alliances, or
various forms of South-South alliances. A recent successful example was the
development of the G-20 during the Cancfin Ministerial. Although its success
was short-lived, the Group was instrumental in preventing the WTO member
states from reaching agreement on such issues as investment, competition
policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation. 157 Its success
eventually led to the premature ending of the ministerial conference and the
Bush administration's change of focus from multilateral negotiations to
bilateral or regional agreements.
Today, there is a tendency to view bilateral or regional agreements with
skepticism, partly as a result of their wide and controversial uses by the
European Communities and the United States to ratchet up global intellectual
property standards.158 However, these agreements are not always destructive
to the international intellectual property regime, and they remain an effective
way to build coalitions within the less developed world. At times, they may
even help promote multilateralism by fostering common positions among
participating countries.
As Professor Cho pointed out, "regionalism may contribute to
multilateralism under certain circumstances through a 'laboratory effect'.
After experiencing trial and error as well as learning-by-doing in the regional
level, countries may feel confident in ratcheting these regional initiatives up to
the multilateral forum."159 Likewise, during the heated debate on the U.S.-
Japan trade policy in the 1980s, Senator Max Baucus highlighted the many
benefits of bilateral agreements, which he claimed might "provide at least a
partial model for a future multilateral agreement." 6 ' As he explained:
157 See Becker, supra note 25; The Cancun Failure, supra note 25.
158 See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 35, at 392-400 (discussing the
growing use of bilateral and regional trade agreements).
159 Cho, supra note 52, at 238 (footnote omitted); see also John Braithwaite, Methods of
Power for Development: Weapons of the Weak, Weapons of the Strong, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L.
297, 313 (2004) (noting that bilateral trade agreements "progressively lock more States into
the preferred U.S. multilateral outcome until the point is reached where the United States can
attempt to nail that multilateral agenda again"); Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism?
Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J.
127, 143 (2004) (noting that "multilateral efforts to harmonize intellectual property norms
should be anticipated by developing countries once the network of bilateral agreements is
sufficiently dense to warrant a mechanism to consolidate and (perhaps improve) the gains
from bilateralism"); Rolland, supra note 59, at 519 ("Regionalism is sometimes seen as a
stepping stone toward multilateralism; given institutional and economic difficulties in
developing countries such an intermediate step could be highly beneficial to the improved
integration of these members in the WTO.").
160 Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case for Bilateral Agreements, 22 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 1, 21-22 (1989).
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By opening markets on a bilateral basis, otherwise insoluble
political problems can be attacked incrementally; bilateral
agreements might break the political ice for multilateral
agreements. Once the first steps have been taken to eliminate a
trade barrier or solve an economic problem for one nation,
political problems appear less formidable and it is easier to reach
similar agreements with other nations. For example, opening the
Japanese construction market to the entire world might be
extremely difficult politically for Japanese officials. Opening it
only to the United States might be somewhat easier. Once the
market is opened partially and the Japanese industry and
government become accustomed to the new situation, further
liberalization will be easier to achieve. Far from derailing the
GATT, bilateral agreements can blaze a trail that the GATT can
follow.",'
Moreover, regional trade agreements hold a unique place in the WTO
system. Because "the GATT and the WTO recognize regional trade groups
and give them certain rights[,] ... being a party to a recognized [regional
trade agreement may be] the only way to gain legal status as a group of
members in the WTO."1 2 Given the importance of these agreements in the
WTO, it is, therefore, important to distinguish South-South agreements from
their unpopular counterparts-North-South agreements, such as those free
trade agreements pushed by the United States and economic partnership
agreements initiated by the European Communities. As Sisule Musungu and
others noted in the context of developing South-South regional frameworks:
A regional approach to the use of TRIPS flexibilities will enable
similarly situated countries to address their constraints jointly by
drawing on each others' expertise and experience and by pooling
and sharing resources and information. This approach has
several advantages. First, it creates better policy conditions for
addressing the challenges of implementing TRIPS flexibilities,
which can be daunting for each individual country. Second, a
common approach to improve access to essential medicines will
enhance the efforts by developing countries to pursue common
negotiating positions at the WTO and in other multilateral
negotiations such as those on a substantive patent law at the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). In addition, a
regional approach coincides with the objective of enhancing
South-South cooperation on health and development.
161 Id. at 22.
162 Rolland, supra note 59, at 497. Nevertheless, there has been growing recognition of
groups within the WTO. As Amrita Narlikar noted: "More recently, the Doha Development
Agenda made explicit references to groups such as Small and Vulnerable Economies group and
the LDC group. References to coalitions such as the Cairns Group and the ASEAN can be
easily found on the WTO website." NARLIKAR, supra note 77, at 52.
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Consequently, if strategically utilized, regional South-South
frameworks will significantly help developing countries devise
ways by which national constraints in the use of TRIPS
flexibilities can be overcome." 3
Likewise, two political scientists have noted that "[s]hared historical
experiences among states of a particular region develop over time ..., and the
cultural affinities which facilitate commerce are more likely with
neighbouring peoples than with those from afar.""' It is, therefore, no
surprise that Amrita Narlikar found "coalitions that utilize regionalism as a
springboard for bargaining... [to be] 'natural coalitions.""65
Nevertheless, it is important to ensure that these South-South agreements
will not further divide the less developed world. After all, as Professor Cho
aptly noted, "the Guild nature of [bilateral and regional agreements] tends to
materialize mercantilist outcomes among their members at the expense of
non-members."'66 By separating the more economically developed members
from the less economically developed members-or, worse, the can-do
countries from the won't-do countries-South-South agreements can deepen
the plight of the weaker members of the less developed world just the same
way as the unpopular North-South bilateral or regional trade agreements.
B. NORTH-SOUTH COOPERATION
Although the WTO and the international intellectual property regime
remain heavily state-centered, the participation of non-state actors (such as
multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations) and sub-
state agents has grown considerably. During the Cancfin Ministerial, "most
high-profile [nongovernmental organizations], such as Greenpeace, Oxfam,
and Public Citizen, explicitly backed the developing countries' stand and
heavily criticized developed countries, in particular the US and the EU, for a
lack of consideration for their poorer trading partners."6 7 While "[s]ome
operated as think tanks in supporting the agenda of developing countries[,
o]thers issued statements expressing political support for the demands of the
G2 0."168
In addition, sub-state agents have become increasingly active. As Chris
Alden noted with respect to China's government and business ties in Africa,
Chinese provincial and municipal authorities have untaken major initiatives
to establish formal and informal ties in South Africa, the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Namibia, Angola, and Nigeria.'69 In recent years, there has also
163 MUSUNGU ET AL., supra note 9, at xiv.
164 William D. Coleman & Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, Introduction: Domestic Politics,
Regional Economic Co-operation, and Global Economic Integration, in REGIONALISM AND
GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: EUROPE, ASIA AND THE AMERICAS 1, 1 (William D. Coleman
& Geoffrey R.D. Underhill eds., 1998).
165 NARLIKAR, supra note 77, at 155.
166 Cho, supra note 52, at 238.
167 Id. at 235.
168 Andrew Hurrell & Amrita Narlikar, A New Politics of Confrontation? Brazil and
India in Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 20 GLOBAL Soc'Y 415, 424 (2006).
169 See ALDEN, supra note 73, at 29.
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been an interesting emergence of non-national systems, such as the adoption
of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy17° (UDRP) in
October 1999 by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), a private not-for-profit corporation in California. 17
Thus, instead of focusing on state-to-state relationships, less developed
countries need to better understand the importance and challenges for
working with nongovernmental organizations and sub-state agents and within
non-national systems. They also "need to work consistently with U.S. and
European political allies to alter the U.S. and European domestic political
contexts.""' In doing so, these allies will be able to obtain support within the
domestic deliberative processes in developed countries that is similar to the
support they have already received within their own countries or in the less
developed world. As Gregory Shaffer elaborated:
Domestic and international non-governmental advocates, such as
ACT UP, Doctors Without Borders, and Oxfam, ... raise
fundamental moral issues to hold US and EC political leaders
accountable. They also harness the public's self-interest over the
cost of prescription drugs and public officials' struggles to finance
health care commitments within the United States and Europe
themselves.'7"
Indeed, "when TRIPS issues become politicized domestically within the
United States and Europe, developing countries retain greater leeway to
formulate intellectual property policies to fit their own needs."' 74
Even if these countries are unable to obtain their desirable policy
outcomes through the political processes in the developed world, their foreign
allies may be able to significantly reduce the political pressure developed
countries will exert upon their less developed counterparts. As Professor
Shaffer continued:
170 Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Numbers, Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-
Resolution Policy (Aug. 26, 1999), www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm.
'71 See Peter K. Yu, Five Disharmonizing Trends in the International Intellectual
Property Regime, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND
PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 73, 88-91 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (including the creation of
non-national systems as a response to Internet disputes as one of the five disharmonizing
trends in the international intellectual property regime).
172 Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods, supra note 29, at 479; see also Antonio Ortiz
Mena L.N., Getting to "No:" Defending Against Demands in NAFTA Energy Negotiations-in
NEGOTIATING TRADE, supra note 22, at 177, 212 (noting the need to "[e]xploit opportunities
offered by [the negotiating] partner's political system to monitor and change its negotiating
positions"); J.P. Singh, The Evolution of National Interests: New Issues and North-South
Negotiations During the Uruguay Round, in NEGOTIATING TRADE, supra note 22, at 41, 47
(noting that "divisions in the ranks of the domestic constituencies of the North can be
exploited by developing countries to their benefit or can make effective agenda-setting and
coalition-building difficult for the North").
173 Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods, supra note 29, at 480; see also Cho, supra note
52, at 240 (noting that the support less developed countries obtain from international and
nongovernmental organizations "is likely to have a ripple effect even in the domestic political
realm").
174 Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods, supra note 29, at 481.
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If developing countries cannot neutralize the clout of large
pharmaceutical firms in the formation of US and European
positions, then developing countries will face the full brunt of US
and European coercion in the negotiation and enforcement of
pharmaceutical patent rights. In a world of asymmetric power,
developing countries enhance the prospects of their success if
other US and European constituencies offset the pharmaceutical
industry's pressure on US and European trade authorities to
aggressively advance industry interests. 175
Despite the importance of cultivating allies in other countries, this point is
sometimes lost on less developed countries, whose "domestic lobbies have
played a much smaller role in determining foreign economic policy than in the
developed democracies .
"17
To date, there has been significant collaboration between policymakers in
less developed countries and nongovernmental organizations in both
developed and less developed countries. Intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations that have been active in the public health area
include ACT UP!, Health Action International, Health GAP, the International
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Knowledge Ecology
International (formerly the Consumer Project on Technology), M~decins Sans
Fronti~res (MSF), Oxfam, the South Centre, the Third World Network, the
Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac), and the Treatment Action
Campaign, among others. As these North-South alliances are built and
strengthened, they will be able to push for policies that will support greater
access to essential medicines in less developed countries.
Academics and the media in the North can also play very important roles.
The ability of academics and their institutions to help identify policy choices
and negotiating strategies and to develop technical capacity in less developed
countries have been widely noted. From the law and development movement
to the wide variety of legal and constitutional reforms introduced in the "new"
republics in Eastern and Central Europe, academics have been very active in
offering advice and assistance-sometimes to the disappointment of the local
populace.' 77 However, the importance of the media in the international
debate has been rarely discussed until recently. As John Odell and Susan Sell
have noted:
[A] developing country coalition seeking to claim value from
dominant states in any regime will increase its gains if it captures
the attention of the mass media in industrial countries and
persuades the media to reframe the issue using a reference point
more favorable to the coalition's position, other things equal.1'7
175 Id. at 479-80.
176 NARLIKAR, supra note 77, at 4.
177 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 46, at 219 (noting the need to provide
.regular training programs that provide the basic understanding of intellectual property rights
and general expertise in the drafting, implementation, and enforcement of intellectual
property laws... [and] advanced seminars that help people keep pace with the new legal and
technological developments in the country and abroad").
178 Odell & Sell, supra note 22, at 87.
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The importance of framing was further underscored by John Braithwaite and
Peter Drahos. As they declared: "Had TRIPS been framed as a public health
issue, the anxiety of mass publics in the US and other Western states might
have become a factor in destabilizing the consensus that US business elites
had built around TRIPS."179
In addition, commentators have underscored the need to design and
stimulate alliances between generic manufacturers in the developed and less
developed worlds. With caution, cooperation between brand name and
generic manufacturers can also be beneficial, although commentators are
generally wary of such cooperation. If developed properly, such alliances "can
provide efficiencies, foster dynamic competition, enhance their competitive
ability and benefit consumers." "' To obtain maximum benefits, these
alliances can be set up not only within the less developed world, but also
between the developed and less developed worlds-perhaps with the
assistance of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. It may
also be helpful for public authorities in less developed countries to coordinate
strategies with private generic pharmaceutical sector.'
Finally, North-South cooperation can go beyond a specific field. For
instance, it may be useful to develop cross-discipline cooperation linkages
between health and medical experts in the North and intellectual property
offices in the South. As commentators have noted, the participation of health
officials and ministries in trade negotiations is scant and inadequate.' In
Professor Drahos's contribution to this Symposium, he advocated
coordination between patent offices and health and medical experts in making
assessment of an invention's contribution to innovation and health welfare.
8 3
Drawing on experience of ANVISA, the Brazilian National Health
Surveillance Agency, he explained that these experts are likely to be in a much
better position than patent examiners to make such an assessment. While
there is no doubt that the Brazilian model and greater cooperation between
patent offices and health experts will benefit many less developed countries,
such a model is not limited to the country or the region. Greater cooperation
between intellectual property offices in the South and health and medical
experts and related nongovernmental organizations in the North is likely to be
equally, or if not more, fruitful.
C. THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS
One of the major features of the WTO is its mandatory dispute settlement
process. While the United States and the European Communities have
dominated the process in the first few years of existence of the WTO,
especially when the disputes involved the TRIPs Agreement, less developed
179 JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 576 (2000).
SO Barbara Rosenberg, Market Concentration of the Transnational Pharmaceutical
Industry and the Generic Industries: Trends on Mergers, Acquisitions and Other Transactions,
in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 83, at 65, 76.
181 See Shaffer, supra note 29. at 481.
182 See MUSUNGU ET AL., supra note 9, at 77.
183 See Peter Drahos, "Trust Me": Patent Offices in Developing Countries, 34 AM. J.L. &
MED. 151 (2008).
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countries have had more frequent use of the process in recent years.' Since
the turn of the millennium, Brazil and India-two of the BRICS countries-
have made much more frequent and extensive use of the process. While they
initially have used the process primarily against less powerful WTO member
states, such as Argentina, Turkey, Mexico, Peru, and Poland, they have started
to use the process more aggressively against powerful WTO member states,
like the European Communities and the United States.
Because globalization and international trade have deeply affected
domestic policies, participating in the WTO dispute settlement process is now
of paramount importance. Such participation will allow countries to develop
WTO jurisprudence in a way that, in turn, would shape the ongoing
negotiations in the areas of international trade, intellectual property, and even
public health. This is what Professor Shaffer has described as negotiation "in
the shadow of" the WTO dispute settlement process.'85 As he explained:
Participation in WTO judicial processes is arguably more
important than is participation in analogous judicial processes
for shaping law in national systems. The difficulty of amending
or interpreting WTO law through the WTO political process
enhances the impact of WTO jurisprudence. WTO law requires
consensus to modify, resulting in a rigid legislative system, with
rule modifications occurring through infrequent negotiating
rounds. Because of the complex bargaining process, rules often
are drafted in a vague manner, thereby delegating de facto power
to the WTO dispute settlement system to effectively make WTO
law through interpretation.
As a result of the increased importance of WTO jurisprudence
and the rigidity of the WTO political process, those governments
that are able to participate most actively in the WTO dispute
settlement system are best-positioned to effectively shape the
law's interpretation and application over time."8 6
Such an approach makes a lot of sense. After all, there is no indication
that the WTO dispute settlement panels are biased toward stronger protection
of intellectual property rights. In the decisions issued thus far, the panelists
have focused narrowly on the language of the TRIPs Agreement, taking into
consideration the recognized international rules of interpretation, the context
of the TRIPs negotiations, and the past and subsequent developments of
184 See Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System, supra note 124, at 17 ("The first half of
[the first ten years of operation of the WTO dispute settlement process]-from 1995 through
1999-was characterized by extensive use of the system by the United States initially, and later
by the EU."); id. at 24 (noting that "the US and the EC no longer were as dominant as
complainants in the system" and that "developing country use of the system increased
dramatically" in the second half of the first decade of operation of the WTO dispute settlement
process).
185 Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods, supra note 29, at 477; see also Christina L. Davis,
Do WTO Rules Create a Level Playing Field? Lessons from the Experience of Peru and Vietnam,
in NEGOTIATING TRADE, supra note 22, at 219, 220 (arguing that "the use of legal adjudication
allows developing countries to gain better outcomes in negotiations with their powerful trade
partners than they could in a bilateral negotiation outside of the institution").
186 Id. at 470.
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treaties governing the areas. In Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products, the panel even referred favorably to the limitations and public
interest safeguards contained in the TRIPs Agreement. 8 7 As the panel
declared: "Both the goals and the limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8.1 must
obviously be borne in mind when [examining the words of the limiting
conditions in article 30] as well as those of other provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement which indicate its object and purposes."'88 This decision was
particularly important, because it was issued before the conclusion of the
Doha Declaration. As Frederick Abbott reminded us:
In late 1999, the political pressures resulting from aggressive US
and EC policies on TRIPS were building up, but public antipathy
towards that conduct had not yet manifested itself at the level
surrounding the Medicines Act trial in South Africa. The Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health was
about two years off. 89
Moreover, as I noted elsewhere in the context of the United States'
ongoing WTO dispute with China over the lack of intellectual property
enforcement, the European Communities and the United States did not win
all of the disputes "litigated" before the Dispute Settlement Body. 90 In June
2000, for example, the United States lost its dispute with the European
Communities over section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, which enables
restaurants and small establishments to play copyrighted music without
compensating copyright holders. 91 In a subsequent ruling, section 211(a)(2)
of the U.S. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, which prohibited the
registration or renewal of trademarks previously abandoned by trademark
holders whose business and assets have been confiscated under Cuban law,
was found to be inconsistent with the TRIPs Agreement. 92
In addition, the WTO panel curtailed the ability of the U.S.
administration to pursue retaliatory actions before exhausting all remedies
permissible under the WTO rules, even though it nominally upheld sections
301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974.19' Most recently, the Caribbean islands of
Antigua and Barbuda successfully challenged U.S. laws on Internet and
telephone gambling. 94 In United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, an arbitration panel determined
187 Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R
(Mar. 17, 2000).
188 Id. 7.26.
189 Frederick M. Abbott, Bob Hudec as Chair of the Canada-Generic Pharmaceuticals
Panel-The WTO Gets Something Right, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 733, 736 (2003).
]80 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 49, at 939-40.
191 See Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
WT/DS/160/R (June 15, 2000).
'9' Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations
Act of1998, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002).
" See Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
'9' Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).
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that "the annual level of nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to
Antigua is US$21 million."95
While many of the United States' losses came from its archrival, the
European Communities, the WTO dispute settlement process is not reserved
for use by powerful WTO member states. The last dispute has shown that, in
the WTO process, even two tiny Caribbean islands can prevail over a trading
giant like the United States. One can imagine how effective the use of this
process can be when less developed countries team up with one or more of the
BRICS countries-as co-complainants or third parties-or when the BRICS
countries join together. On the one hand, this collective effort can pull
together scarce economic and legal resources to defend laws that seek to
exploit the flexibilities provided by the TRIPs Agreement and explicitly
affirmed by the Doha Declaration. 196 On the other hand, less developed
countries can use these resources to design effective strategies to challenge
non-TRIPs-compliant legislation in developed countries.
Compared to the uncoordinated arrangement where each country has to
file a separate complaint, or join the complainant as a third party, the
collaborative strategy has at least five benefits. First, countries will be able to
significantly reduce the costs of WTO litigation, thus lowering the threshold
for determining whether it would be worthwhile to file a WTO complaint. In
his earlier analysis, Professor Shaffer showed how it might not be worthwhile
for a small or poor country to file a WTO complaint even when there was a
high economic stake. Based on 2004 figures, he found that "an average WTO
claim costs in the range of US$300,000-400,000 in attorneys' fees.' 97 While
$200,000 of potential loss in trade may be highly important to the economy
of a small, poor country, such a loss does not always justify taking the case to
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body or defending it there. Instead, these
countries often give up their valid claims.1 9s If they are sued, they often settle
195 Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, United
States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 3.189,
WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007).
196 Paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration specifically recognizes the following
flexibilities:
a. In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law,
each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object
and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and
principles.
b. Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to
determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.
c. Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that
public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria
and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances
of extreme urgency.
d. The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each member free to establish
its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN and
national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4.
Doha Declaration, supra note 3, 5.
97 Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods, supra note 29, at 473.
'9' See id. at 472 ("When large developed countries, such as the United States and EC,
can absorb high litigation costs by dragging out a WTO case, while imposing them on
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the claims by either abandoning legal or policy experiments that are
permissible under the WTO agreements or by transplanting laws from abroad
against their wishes and benefits.
This is particularly problematic from the standpoint of the TRIPs
negotiations. One of the primary reasons why less developed countries
reluctantly agreed to increase intellectual property protection is the ability to
use the WTO dispute settlement process as a bulwark against developed
countries' coercive, and often unilateral, tactics. As some less developed
countries claimed at the time of the TRIPs negotiations, it would be pointless
for them to join the WTO if the United States was able to continue imposing
unilateral sanctions despite their membership. 199 Unfortunately, the high
start-up costs required by the WTO dispute settlement process have made it
very difficult for less developed countries to benefit from their hard-earned
bargains through the WTO negotiations.
More problematically, the lack of participation by some less developed
countries in the WTO dispute settlement process can hurt the protection of
other less developed countries. As Professor Shaffer reminded us: "Who
participates in the institutional process affects which arguments will be
presented, which, in turn, affects how the competing concerns over patent
protection, public health, and market competition will be weighed."0 ° Thus,
if the WTO rules are to be shaped to advance the interests of the less
developed world, greater participation by less developed countries in the WTO
dispute settlement process is needed.
Second, less developed countries can benefit from the additional expertise
and resources provided by other less developed countries. Instead of spending
a substantial amount of money on outside counsel, or spending even more in
developing local expertise,2 °1 less developed countries can take advantage of
the cost-sharing arrangement and devote the saved resources to improving the
living standards of their nationals. 22 If the BRICS coalition or partial BRICS
alliances are involved, less developed countries can benefit from even more
sophisticated expertise. Some of the BRICS countries, like Brazil, India, and
China, have been active litigants in the WTO dispute settlement process. Over
the years, they have developed considerable expertise that can be used by or
shared with other less developed countries. Even South Africa, which is
relatively quiet in the WTO dispute settlement process, and Russia, which
remains outside the WTO, have more experience in resolving international
trade disputes than most less developed countries.
developing country parties, they can enhance developing countries' incentives to settle a
dispute unfavorably.").
199 See Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 77, at 372. For a discussion of the
bargaining narrative concerning the origins of the TRIPs Agreement, see id. at 371-73.
200 Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods, supra note 29, at 465.
201 See id. at 475 ("Because of developing countries' less frequent use of the WTO system
and their lack of local legal capital, the alternative for a developing country to train internal
lawyers with WTO expertise is typically worse than hiring expensive US or European outside
legal counsel.").
202 See id.
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Third, as repeat players in WTO litigation, less developed countries will
benefit from the economies of scale in deploying legal resources." 3 They are
also more likely to possess the mindset of planning legal strategies that will
help them advance the interests of the less developed world and to strengthen
their overall legal positions, rather than strategies that seek to win only one
case at a time.20 4 In doing so, these countries can use the WTO dispute
settlement process effectively to shape both the judicial interpretation and the
future negotiation of the TRIPs Agreement in a pro-development manner.
They may even be able to regain the momentum less developed countries lost
during the TRIPs negotiations due to their limited understanding of
intellectual property rights and weak bargaining power. Thus far, the
European Communities and the United States are able to advance their
commercial interests through the WTO dispute settlement process, due partly
to their predominant use of this process.2"' However, greater strategic use of
the process by less developed countries may greatly curtail the ability by
developed countries to advance those interests.
Fourth, as a group, less developed countries do not need to worry as much
about the backlashes they will receive when they alone file a complaint against
the European Communities or the United States before the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body. As William Davey noted, when countries do not face each
other often as adversaries in the WTO process, "initiation of a complaint
would be something of a slap in the face. The ignominy of a loss would also
loom larger."20 6 By taking collective action, many otherwise infrequent
players in the WTO dispute settlement process will become more frequent
players. As they become involved in more complaints against the European
Communities or the United States, and as each of these parties has its share of
wins and losses, the impact of a WTO dispute on diplomatic relations will be
greatly reduced.20 7
Finally, as commentators have rightly questioned, less developed
countries may not "have the diplomatic or economic muscle to ensure that the
decision is implemented" even if they win their case.208 Indeed, as Professor
Davey has pointed out, there is a good chance that "even massive retaliation
by a small country would be unnoticed by a larger one."2° 9 Thus, by uniting
together, less developed countries may be able to have more leverage at the
enforcement level by increasing the economic impact of trade
countermeasures permitted by the WTO dispute settlement panel.
203 See id. at 474.
204 See id. at 470.
205 See id.
206 William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GAIT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 71 (1987).
207 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 49, at 945.
208 Davey, Dispute Settlement in GA7T, supra note 206, at 90.
209 Id. at 102; see also Rolland, supra note 59, at 544 (noting that "one of the problems
often mentioned with respect to the WTO's dispute settlement procedure is the insufficient
leverage of developing countries at the enforcement level due to their limited potential for
trade countermeasures against large economies").
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D. REGIONAL OR PRO-DEVELOPMENT FoRA
Regional or pro-development fora are particularly effective means for
coordinating efforts by less developed countries in the areas of public health,
intellectual property, and international trade. These fora will provide the
much-needed focal points for countries to share experience, knowledge, and
best practices and to coordinate negotiation and litigation strategies. 210
Through these fora, less developed countries could "(i) raise political
awareness of certain members ... ; (ii) help define the agenda, prior to the
actual negotiations. .. ; and (iii) achieve particular regulatory outcomes on a
particular issue or economic sector or sub-sector ... and defend interests in
dispute settlement."
211
In addition, these fora allow countries to reframe issues "in a way that
eases impasses,"212 thus providing a mechanism to balance interests internal to
the group while resolving conflicts or negotiation deadlocks before enlarging
the negotiations to include some developed countries or the entire developed
world.2 13 They also facilitate "a pooling of organisational resources, and enable
countries will ill-defined interests to avail themselves of the research efforts of
allies and a possible country-wise division of research and labour across issue
areas."
214
Through these fora, the interests of the participating countries would be
better and more symmetrically represented.215 The fora would also "help build
capacity for the group's members as they would gain leverage through access
to a more central and streamlined channel of information (through the group
representation) and in turn be able to better formulate their own policy
positions."21' These functions are especially important, considering the fact
that some less developed countries have given up their participation in
international fora due to a lack of financial resources or political
circumstances.
As commentators have pointed out, many less developed countries lack
the resources . . . to send delegates to these fora and thus have resorted to
210 See Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods, supra note 29, at 478 ("Regional centers
could create benchmarks for policy, provide a forum for the sharing of experiences, and
identify best practices. Regional centers could also better coordinate training of developing
country officials and non-governmental representatives."); accord MUSUNGU ET AL., supra
note 9, at xiv-xv (noting the need to develop mechanisms that serve "as a central feature of an
institutionalized approach to regional research and innovation including essential health
research and, in particular, as a focal point for training, research, information exchange and
political coordination in the use of TRIPS flexibilities for public health promotion and
protection"); NARLIKAR, supra note 77, at 206 (noting "the significance of a sustained process
that allows coalition members to meet frequently and further develop and revise their
agenda").
211 Rolland, supra note 59, at 499.
212 Odell, supra note 78, at 16.
213 See id. at 501 ("A common agenda may not exist in a form strong enough to provide a
platform for negotiations with third parties but a discussion group may help bring
participants' positions closer or assist in overcoming negotiation deadlocks.").
214 NARLIKAR, supra note 77, at 14.
21 See Rolland, supra note 59, at 512.
216 Id.
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using nongovernmental organizations . . . to represent their interests."1 7 In
one instance, the Foundation for International Environmental Law and
Development, a London-based environmental nongovernmental organization,
negotiated a deal to represent Sierra Leone before the WTO Committee on
Trade and Environment."" Even if countries are willing to send delegates,
they may have become formally inactive due to their failure to pay dues for a
certain period of time. In the WTO, for example, their inactive status would
prevent them from chairing any bodies within the organization. 9 Many
delegations are also affected by their limited institutional capacity, delegation
size, geopolitical capital, and overall expertise.22°
In addition, regional or pro-development fora could help improve the
human capital and WTO know-how of less developed countries by "better
coordinat[ing] training of developing country officials and non-governmental
representatives."22 ' As one commentator noted:
Regional seminars play an important role in the WTO's training
activities, with seventy sessions offered during the year [2007]
(compared with single-digit numbers of sessions for other types
of training activities). The Technical Assistance Plan
acknowledges that regionally based activities "allow WTO ... to
reach a homogeneous audience based in the region and interested
in the same subject matter .... It also facilitates exchange of
information, sharing of experiences and networking among
participants" at the regional level. These programs, particularly
those for government officials, give priority to topics under
negotiation and are meant to be immediately useful to
participants in regional and international trade negotiations.
Similarly, regional trade policy courses explicitly aim at
"build[ing] capacity at the regional level."222
Coordination at the regional level and among less developed countries is
also important in light of the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade
agreements initiated by the European Communities and the United States.
Because those agreements tend to transplant laws based on models developed
in their home countries, 2 3 they are notorious for ignoring the local needs,
217 John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 511, 557 n.256 (2000).
218 See Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy
and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 62-63 (2001).
219 See NARLIKAR, supra note 77, at 15.
220 See Rolland, supra note 59, at 529 (noting that "in practice [the participation of
member states in WTO working groups] would largely be constrained by the member's
institutional capacity and delegation size").
221 Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods, supra note 29, at 478.
222 Rolland, supra note 59, at 507 (footnotes omitted).
223 As the Trade Act of 2002 stated:
The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade-related
intellectual property are.., to further promote adequate and effective protection
of intellectual property rights, including through ... ensuring that the provisions
of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement governing intellectual property
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national interests, technological capabilities, institutional capacities, and
public health conditions of less developed countries. Even worse, these
agreements sometimes call for a higher level of protection than what is
currently offered in the developed world.224 If the European Communities or
the United States does not see it beneficial to have higher protection, one has
to wonder why protection needs to be strengthened in countries that have
even more limited resources and that do not possess adequate safeguards and
correction mechanisms.
If that is not problematic enough, less developed countries may be
"induced" into signing conflicting agreements with both the European
Communities and the United States.225 While these two trading powers are
interested in having strong global intellectual property standards, there
remain a large number of intellectual property conflicts between the two. In
the copyright context, for example, they take different positions on "the
protection of moral rights, fair use, the first sale doctrine, the work-made-for-
hire arrangement, and protection against private copying in the digital
environment."226 They also approach the patent filing process differently and
greatly disagree on how to protect geographical indications. 27 Indeed, had
the United States refused to include geographical indications in the proposed
GATT treaty, the European Communities' initial ambivalent position toward
the creation of the TRIPs Agreement might not have changed.2
In view of these differences, conflicts may arise if less developed countries
sign the trade agreements supplied by both the European Communities and
the United States without appropriate review and modification. To be
certain, it is not the fault of these trading powers that policymakers in less
developed countries are unable to review or modify the agreement;
oftentimes, it is the result of a lack of resources, expertise, leadership,
negotiation sophistication, or bargaining power. Many policymakers in less
developed countries are also blinded by the benefits their countries may
receive in other trade areas under a package deal-or, worse, they are just too
eager to appease, or develop "friendship" with, the trading powers.
Nevertheless, it is still highly lamentable that these countries would enter into
conflicting agreements that could be avoided with more caution, coordination,
rights that is entered into by the United States reflect a standard of protection
similar to that found in United States law ....
19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(A)(i)(II) (2004).
2214 See Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the TO
System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 79, 93 (2004); Peter K. Yu,
Anticircumvention and Anti-Anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 13, 41 (2006).
225 See Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 77, at 407.
226 Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global Intellectual
Property Disputes: What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business Strategists, and
International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 625-26 (2002) [hereinafter Yu,
Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach] (citations omitted).
227 See Panel Report, European Communities-Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15,
2005).
228 See WATAL, supra note 23, at 23 (noting that the European Communities began to
root for a GATT treaty "perhaps after a decision among developed countries to include the
subject of geographical indications").
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and information. It is bad enough to be forced to sign a bilateral agreement
that does not meet local conditions. It is even worse to be put in a position
where they have to juggle two conflicting agreements that do not meet local
conditions and that are impossible to honor.
Fortunately for less developed countries, regional or pro-development
fora may provide the much-needed institutional response to the growing use
of bilateral and regional trade agreements to push for stronger intellectual
property standards and to further reduce the policy space needed for the
development of intellectual property, trade, and public health policies. While
the always short-staffed Advisory Centre on WTO Law provides legal advice
and support in WTO matters and trains government officials in WTO law,
they do not provide assistance in coordinating political, judicial, and forum-
shifting strategies in an increasingly complex international intellectual
property lawmaking environment. 9 They also provide very limited assistance
in developing negotiating strategies concerning the bilateral or regional trade
agreements initiated by the European Communities and the United States.
By bringing countries together, these fora would allow policymakers in
less developed countries to share their latest experience and lessons
concerning these agreements. In doing so, the participating countries would
have more information to evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of the potential
treaties. They would also be able to anticipate problems and potential side-
effects created by these treaties. They might even be able to better design
prophylactic or correction mechanisms that would become handy should the
treaties prove to be unsuitable for their countries.
Finally, as Sonia Rolland pointed out, "the ability or inability of
developing countries to form and sustain effective coalitions in the WTO
depends not only on the coalitions' inherent characteristics and the political
environment.... but also on the institutional and legal framework in which
they operate." 23o Except for supranational entities like the European
Communities, special classifications like least developed countries, or
recognized regional trade agreements, the WTO offers very limited support
for formal representation by groups in policy deliberation. Thus, if less
developed countries can use these regional or pro-development fora to
develop strategies to push for greater legal or structural changes within
international organizations that will make group representation easier to
obtain and the institution more coalition-friendly, they are more likely to be
able to increase their bargaining leverage and to develop a stronger voice for
the less developed world. After all, "the ability to sustain developing country
coalitions depends in part on the WTO's legal structure... [M]embers whose
interests might be more effectively served if they are promoted by a group
strategy could [also] benefit from a legal framework that better supports
developing country coalitions or groupings."23'
229 See Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods, supra note 29, at 478.
230 Rolland, supra note 59, at 505.
231 Id. at 485.
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V. CHALLENGES
Although both the BRICS coalition and partial BRICS alliances can play
important roles in the international intellectual property regime and the use
of coordination strategies can help less developed countries strengthen their
collective bargaining position, there are some remaining challenges, however.
As discussed earlier, coalition-building efforts put up by less developed
countries historically have failed. Such failure, indeed, was one of the primary
reasons why I find it more realistic to encourage less developed countries to
enter into partial BRICS alliances, as compared to forming the complete
BRICS coalition.
Despite their limited success, the past coalition-building efforts have
provided important lessons for the development of future cooperative
endeavors. There have also been some success stories. As Amrita Narlikar,
Sonia Rolland, and others have shown, issue-based coalitions for small and
very specialized economies with common profiles and interests, such as those
"small island economies with similar geographic/strategic endowments,
concentrated interests in tourism exports, and travel imports," have been
fairly successful. 2 The high-profile Cairns Group, a crossover coalition that
sought to include agriculture in the GATT system, brought together both
developed and less developed countries2 33 and "became a 'model' for other
coalitions-the Food Importers' Group, the Friends of Services, and several
other later coalitions."234 In addition, the G-20 helped less developed
countries establish a united negotiating front during the Cancin
Ministerial.23
One may wonder why the BRICS countries would be willing to team up
with their less powerful trading partners.236 After all, it seems that the
strength, wealth, and sophistication of the BRICS countries would make
collective action less attractive to them than to other less developed countries.
There are several reasons. First, numbers matter in a "one country, one vote"
system, like WIPO and the United Nations. There are only five BRICS
countries, but many more less developed countries. Second, the latter may
provide attractive markets for pharmaceutical manufacturers in less
developed countries, which may not be burdened by the blockbuster drug
model and the high profit threshold. This picture, nevertheless, may change
as generic manufacturers in the BRICS countries, such as those in India,
232 NARLIKAR, supra note 77, at 122-23.
233 See id. at 128-47 (discussing the rise, success, and limitations of the Cairns Group);
see also Rolland, supra note 59, at 491 ("The Cairns Group gained significant weight leverage
during the round, leverage which has endured because it brought together developed and
developing countries that were likely to help bridge the gap between the most extreme
negotiating positions.").
14 NARLIKAR, supra note 77, at 8.
For an explanation of the success of the coalitions less developed countries built at
the Cancdn Ministerial, see Amrita Narlikar & Diana Tussie, The G20 and the Cancun
Ministerial: Developing Countries and Their Evolving Coalitions in the WTO, 27 WORLD
EcoN. 947(2004).
236 Thanks to Robert Bird and Dan Cahoy for pushing me to focus on this important
question.
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become more active in developing on-patent drugs, partly as a result of the
TRIPs Agreement.
Third, historically, countries like Brazil and India have taken leadership
roles in the development of intellectual property policies. Although "[i]t is...
not clear that India and Brazil are prepared to provide the general leadership
on intellectual property issues that they once did,"237 many of these countries,
like China and India, are still very eager to take up the role of regional power,
if not a world power. So, there is still a very good chance that their interests in
geopolitics may spill over into the politics of intellectual property rights.
Finally, as I explained earlier, the wide gap between the rich and the poor
and the growing regional disparities in the BRICS countries have induced
their government leaders to develop policies to work more closely with their
poorer trading partners. The fear of domination by either the European
Communities or the United States also created "common enemies" that help
rally the BRICS countries to the side of other less developed countries.
The difficult question for less developed countries, therefore, may not be
how they can attract the BRICS countries to set up an alliance with them.
There will be many reasons for the BRICS countries to engage in collective
action with other less developed countries, even though it is hard to pinpoint
the reasons behind such engagement. Rather, the impending challenge for
these countries concerns how to set up an alliance in a way that would prevent
the BRICS countries from dominating their much weaker and more
dependent partners.238 After all, the former are more powerful and possess
more human capital, technical knowledge, and legal expertise. Without
adequate protection, the BRICS countries may abuse their leadership roles at
the expense of others. Thus, if the partial BRICS alliances are to be successful,
it is important to build safeguards into the alliances to protect the weaker
members and to allow them to retain their autonomy and identity. It is also
important to develop trust among the participating members so that they can
work together closely without worrying about potential exploitation.
This is particularly important in light of the rapidly growing economic
interests of pharmaceutical manufacturers in the BRICS countries and the
eagerness of these countries to serve as regional research-and-development or
supply centers, especially when such regional setups make great economic
sense by allowing the BRICS countries to exploit their comparative
advantages. One may still remember the remark by PhRMA representative
Tom Bombelles where he suggested "South Africa was a pawn used by India
and Argentina to undermine TRIPS."239 Although this remark sought to "shift
237 Drahos, Developing Cbuntries, supra note 73, at 765.
238 As Amrita Narlikar noted:
[W]hile sharing of organisational resources is an asset for the weak, it is
accompanied by the risk that the powerful in the group will use their
organisational skills and resources to dominate the agenda and perhaps even
structure the interests of the weak. Coalitions increase certainty in international
affairs through reliability of allies, but also reduce the policy flexibility of
countries and thereby eat into the already limited negotiating space of the
weakest of developing countries.
NARLIKAR, supra note 77, at 16.
239 Halbert, supra note 58, at 267.
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the focus [unfairly] away from the enormous health crisis in Africa,"2" it does
signal a problem when the debate becomes whether the BRICS countries or
the developed countries will be able to sell medication to other less developed
countries.
Because generic manufacturers in the BRICS countries may benefit from
the continued lack of manufacturing capacity in other less developed
countries, they may even lobby against efforts to help less developed countries
develop local manufacturing capacity or to transfer technology from the
BRICS countries to other less developed countries (although they may not
achieve as much success as their patent-based counterparts in the developed
world)."' If the interests of the weaker alliance members are to be protected,
a clear alliance agreement and a carefully designed benefit-sharing
arrangement may need to be put in place when the alliance is set up.
Another challenge concerns the rapid economic growth of the BRICS
countries and the dynamic development of the pharmaceutical sector in those
countries. As Dwijen Rangnekar noted recently:
[IEn 1999 [there emerged] a new configuration of
pharmaceutical firms, the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance (the
Alliance), consisting of firms like Cipla, Dr Reddy's Laboratories,
Lupin Laboratories and Ranbaxy that collectively account for
30% of domestic production and 33% of Indian exports. The
Alliance is composed of pharmaceutical firms with mixed
interests and areas of expertise: "[the Alliance] ... is perhaps a
little schizophrenic about where its members' interests lie. On
the one hand many of them, such as Ranbaxy, wish to develop as
research based companies and see the value of strong patent
protection to achieve that. On the other hand, the overwhelming
majority of their revenues remain derived from generic
production, and accordingly they share many of the concerns of
[the Indian Drug Manufacturers' Association, a key domestic
group of generic manufacturers]."2 42
As the economy of these countries matures, the structure of the
pharmaceutical sector may change substantially. In fact, this process of
change has been greatly accelerated by the recent partnerships set up between
brand name and generic manufacturers. In 2007, for example, "Merck
partnered with Advinus Therapeutics, an Indian company, to develop drugs
for metabolic disorders, with Merck retaining the right to advance research
240 Id. at 267-68.
241 1 suspect, however, that these manufacturers would be unlikely to achieve as much
success and influence as their patent-based counterparts in the developed world. For a
discussion of why the BRICS alliances are conductive to technology transfer from the BRICS
countries to other less developed countries, see supra text accompanying supra note 134.
242 Dwijen Rangnekar, Context and Ambiguity in the Making of Law: A Comment on
Amending India's Patent Act, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 365, 379-80 (2007) (quoting
COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, NOTES ON THE INDIA FIELD-TRIP (2001)
(citation omitted)).
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into late-stage clinical trials. GlaxoSmithKline and Ranbaxy have also teamed
up."24
As the world becomes more globalized and the volume of international
trade increases, some countries will grow much faster than others. Indeed, in
many areas of international trade, "medium-income developing countries
which have gained relatively more than their poorer counterparts from the
multilateral trade process have increasingly found themselves adopting
positions divergent from those of [their counterparts] on the question of
preferential access to rich country markets."2" If history repeats itself, the
BRICS countries eventually will want stronger intellectual property protection
once they become economically developed.
Among the BRICS countries, China and India-or Chindia, as some
politicians, commentators, and researchers have called them collectively2 45-
are most likely to be the quickest to reach a crossover point at which stronger
intellectual property protection will be in the country's self-interests. This is
not surprising, considering the fact that both countries were the two largest
economies in the world before the Industrial Revolution.24 6
Since the late 1980s, the Chinese economy has been growing at an
enviable average annual rate of about ten per cent.247 China's imports "tripled
from $225 billion in 2000 to $600 billion in 2005," and the country
"accounted for about 12 percent of the growth of global trade," an impressive
jump from only 4 per cent in 2000.248 Because of its ability to lower
production costs and to attract considerable foreign direct investment, China
has become one of the world's largest surplus countries and possesses one of
the world's most sizeable foreign exchange reserves. 24 9 As the Goldman Sachs
study forecasted, "[ifn US dollar terms, China could overtake Germany in the
next four years, Japan by 2015 and the US by 2039. "25o Although China today
is considered the world's manufacturing capital, producing shoes, clothes,
toys, household products, and low-cost electronic goods, the country
eventually will move into the world's high-end market while continuing to
dominate its low-end market.25'
243 NATH, supra note 44, at 102.
244 Rolland, supra note 59, at 536.
245 See, e.g., CHINDIA: How CHINA AND INDIA ARE REVOLUTIONIZING GLOBAL BUSINESS
(Pete Engardio ed., 2006) [hereinafter CHINDIA]; RAMESH, supra note 139; see also DANCING
WITH GIANTS, supra note 103; MEREDITH, supra note 106.
246 See MEREDITH, supra note 106, at 160 (citing Angus Maddison, professor emeritus
at the University of Groningen); see also Angus Maddison, Historical Statistics for the World
Economy: 1-2003 AD (2007), www.ggdc.net/maddison/HistoricalStatistics/horizontal-file-
03-2007.xls.
247 BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 138, at 18. Some early research has placed China's
annual growth rate at a more modest rate of seven to eight per cent. See Symposium, China
and the WTO, supra note 45, at 3.
248 BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 138, at 73.
249 See id. at 4.
250 Wilson & Purushothaman, supra note 13, at 4.
251 See Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 203, 208 (2006) ("China's ambitions are vast: China seeks to maintain its
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Introduction to CHINDIA, supra note 245, at 4 (noting that "Etlhe idea that China will
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India is not far behind, however. As the Goldman Sachs study stated,
"India has the potential to show the fastest growth over the next 30 and 50
years," and its "economy could be larger than all but the US and China in 30
years."252 Growing at a steady rate of above five percent, India was estimated
"to raise its US dollar income per capita in 2050 to 35 times current levels.
' 53
In fact, some analysts have predicted that India will eventually overtake China
in the latter half of the twenty-first century. As Pete Engardio, the Asia
correspondent for Business Week, noted, India might eventually become a
stronger economic power than China, due to its growth in workforce, fixed
investment, and productivity.254 Likewise, Huang Yasheng and Tarun Khanna
observed: "China and India have pursued radically different development
strategies. India is not outperforming China overall but it is doing better in
certain key areas. That success may enable it to catch up with and perhaps
even overtake China."
255
Thus, the interests of the BRICS countries may eventually become quite
far apart from those of other less developed countries, just as the interests of
the less developed world are currently far apart from those of the developed
world. The growing divergence between these two groups of countries is
indeed highly plausible. Nor would the economic emergence of these
countries become a major concern for development experts. After all, most
policymakers, international bureaucrats, and development experts would
rather design policies that enable some less developed countries to catch up
economically and technologically and become more advanced than policies
that would ensure all less developed countries stay economically weak and
technologically backward.
While it remains unclear whether the growth of the BRICS countries will
raise concerns down the road, the analysis of.-both the economies of the
BRICS countries and the positions they have been taking at the international
level seem to suggest that the interests of the BRICS countries and other less
developed countries are quite close at present. Many less developed countries
remain dependent on the leadership supplied by the BRICS countries, in
particular Brazil, China, and India. Thus, in light of the potential for
increased bargaining leverage, greater technology transfer, and active
technical assistance, BRICS countries can serve as worthy allies at least until
their interests grow further apart from those of their less developed partners.
The important question for the weaker partners at the moment, therefore, is
continue to assemble low-end products while high-end manufacturing will always remain in
advanced countries ... is becoming outdated"); Peter K. Yu, Trade Barriers Won't Contain
China's Cars, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 25, 2007, at 15A (discussing China's growing interest in the
American car market and its eagerness to set up "its own national champion automaker").
252 Wilson & Purushothaman, supra note 13, at 4.
253 Id. at 10.
2 4 See Pete Engardio, Why India May Be Destined to Overtake China, in CHINDIA,
supra note 245, at 27; see also MEREDITH, supra note 106, at 57 ("China is winning the sprint,
and [India is] going to win the marathon." (quoting Kamal Nath, India's minister of
commerce and industry)). But see id. at 154 ("China has proved so much more efficient than
India at development and managing its economy that th[e] scenario [that India's economy
will overtake China's] is unlikely unless China falls into political turmoil.").
?51 Yasheng Huang & Tarun Khanna, Can India Overtake China?, FOREIGN POL'Y,
July/Aug. 2003, at 74, 81.
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how they can take advantage of the alliances when the interests of the alliance
members are still close to each other. If they are able to do so, they might
build up their manufacturing capacity and shape the international intellectual
property system in a way that would better advance their interests and protect
their negotiation agendas.
Finally, there are other "IP-irrelevant factors"256 that would make it
difficult for the BRICS countries to cooperate among themselves and with
other less developed countries, such as xenophobia, nationalism, racism,
mistrust, and resentment. No matter how much more globalized and
interdependent the world has become, some countries will always remain
reluctant to cooperate with others, either because of historical conflicts,
border disputes, economic rivalries, cultural differences, or spillover issues
from other areas. The existence of these barriers, however, does not doom the
alliance project. In fact, it demonstrates how coalition building is always a
work in progress that requires care, vision, and continuous attention between
and among the various parties.
It also suggests the importance of using regional approaches to alleviate
the impact of these factors. For example, it may be fruitful to develop several
regional networks-one for Africa, one for East Asia, one for Eastern and
Central Europe, one for South America, and one for South Asia. 257
Interestingly, the BRICS countries would fit very well in this arrangement by
taking up leadership roles in each of these networks: Brazil for South
America, Russia for Eastern and Central Europe, India for South Asia, China
for East Asia, and South Africa for Africa. As they work more closely with
their fellow members, they may open up new possibilities for cross-region
collaboration, thus resulting in the web of alliances I suggested earlier.
In sum, there are many benefits to developing alliances between the
BRICS countries and other less developed countries. There are also many
remaining challenges. If the countries are to work together to develop
successful alliances, they need to clearly articulate their goals, understand
each other better, and work out mutually beneficially arrangements. As I
described elsewhere about the development of strategic partnerships:
[To form a successful strategic partnership, the initiating party]
must identify its needs, understand its strengths, and assess its
"readiness, willingness, and ability to engage in the [partnership]
process." It also must determine the type of partner it needs,
evaluate what each partner is likely to bring to the relationship,
and assess the potential partner "in terms of the complementarity
of assets and skills and the possible synergies" arising from the
partnership.
256 "IP-irrelevant factors" are those factors that are largely unaffected by intellectual
property protection. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 7, at 852-53.
257 Cf. Rolland, supra note 59, at 524 (suggesting the development of the following
geographical-based groups: "a bloc including the Americas, an African bloc, two Asian groups
(one including China and Eastern Asian countries and the other one comprising South Asian
and Central Asian countries), and a Middle Eastern bloc, and possibly a bloc of industrialized
members and an LDC bloc").
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Each [partner] should "devote sufficient attention to the
cultural compatibility between the partners," for the lack of such
attention sometimes may result in the breakdown of the
partnership. It also needs to work with the other to decide how
their respective contributions "can be valued in a fashion that is
fair to both partners, taking note of the downside risks and the
upside potential." To bring the partnership to life, the partners
must further decide the structure of the alliance and the
251decisionmaking processes.
If both the BRICS countries and other less developed countries can use
collective action to their advantage, the development of partial BRICS
alliances, or maybe even the complete BRICS coalition, is not a mere hope,
but a realistic goal. These alliances may eventually be able to reduce the
ongoing push by the European Communities and the United States to ratchet
up global intellectual property standards. The alliances will also help enlarge
the policy space less developed countries need to have in order to develop
their intellectual property, trade, and public health policies. With greater
coordination and leverage, they may even be able to establish, shape, and
enlarge a pro-development negotiating agenda that would recalibrate the
balance of the international intellectual property system.
CONCLUSION
Since the TRIPs Agreement entered into effect in 1995, less developed
countries have been confronted with massive public health crises within their
borders. Although these countries successfully pushed for reforms within the
international intellectual property system during the Doha Round, the
proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements and the growing
enclosure of the policy space needed for the development of intellectual
property, trade, and public health polices have significantly reduced their
ability to respond to public health crises within their borders. Fortunately for
these countries, the emergence of fast-growing BRICS economies has
provided a timely, yet unprecedented opportunity. Hopefully, this Article will
help convince policymakers in less developed countries and nongovernmental
organizations in both the developed and less developed worlds to seize the
opportunity to promote access to essential medicines in less developed
countries.
258 Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach, supra note 226, at 599 (footnotes omitted).
